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ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HARD STATE BORDER CLOSURES
IN RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
BENJAMEN FRANKLEN GUSSEN1
I investigate the constitutionality of hard state border closures in the United
States as a prophylactic response to a pandemic. This type of border closure
prevents people from entering a State, except for exempt travelers, a category
that includes, for example, military, judicial and government officers, and
people granted entry on compassionate grounds. Those allowed to enter usually
have to then go through a quarantine regime before being released into the
community. During the COVID-19 pandemic, no State has attempted such
closures. However, epidemiological experts suggest that, in comparison to other
border and non-border measures, such closures are more effective. Given the
World Health Organization prediction of more pandemics in the foreseeable
future, it is imperative that the constitutionality of such hard closures is
investigated. I use structural analysis to argue that a recent challenge to hard
border closures in Australia suggests that, under a strict scrutiny review, the
Supreme Court is likely to uphold such closures in the United States. While
actual implementation requires investigating issues that go beyond a
constitutional analysis, these findings highlight the need for a wider
conversation around a federal goldilocks zone when responding to the next
pandemic.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General, Dr. Tedros
Adhanom Ghebreyesus, ushered the first International Day of Epidemic
Preparedness, held on 27 December 2020, by reminding us that the coronavirus
crisis “will not be the last pandemic.” 2 Our preparedness to respond to the next
pandemic depends on the lessons we have learned in 2020.3 One key lesson is
the alarming speed with which COVID-19 has spread across the globe.4 The
basic reproduction rate for COVID-19 (𝑅0 ) is estimated at 5.7, which means
that one person infected with COVID-19 can potentially transmit the virus to 56 people.5 In comparison, the 1918 Spanish flu had a reproduction rate between
1.4 and 2.8.6 In some countries, like Australia, the first line of defense was to
close the national borders, given this high contagion rate.7 COVID-19 was
declared a worldwide pandemic by the WHO on 11 March 2020.8 Soon after,
an executive-led response guaranteed international border closures:
On 21 January 2020, the Australian Chief Medical Officer, Dr
Brendan Murphy, determined that the newly emergent ‘human
coronavirus with pandemic potential’ was a communicable disease
with potential to cause significant harm to human health. Australian
federal biosecurity officials began screening arrivals on flights from
Wuhan, China on 23 January 2020 … Australia recorded its first
case [on 25 January 2020]. On 1 February, the Commonwealth
government required returning citizens who had been in mainland
China to self-quarantine for 14 days and closed the border to all
2

Rebecca Falconer, WHO Chief: COVID-19 Crisis Won’t Be the Last Pandemic, AXIOS (Dec.
27, 2020), https://www.axios.com/who-chief-covid-19-wont-be-last-pandemic-68d2a328c4a0-4dac-87ed-9d0b950ea1c9.html.
3 One of the key lessons is the need for an integrated framework that enforces the same
standards of protection to humans and animals alike. See, e.g., Marita Giménez-Candela, The
collapse of the past: COVID-19, 11 DA.DERECHO ANIMAL (F. ANIMAL L. STUD.) 12, 13
(2020) (arguing for the need to establish “a new ethic of integrated health that does not
exclude animals, but includes their protection, and harmoniously integrates human beings
with nature.”).
4 WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March
2020, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/directorgeneral/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-oncovid-19---11-march-2020 (“[The] WHO has been assessing this outbreak around the clock
and we are deeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and severity, and by the
alarming levels of inaction. We have therefore made the assessment that COVID-19 can be
characterized as a pandemic.”).
5
Vanessa Bates Ramirez, What is “R-naught”? Gauging Contagious Infections, HEALTHLINE
(Apr. 20, 2020) https://www.healthline.com/health/r-nought-reproduction-number.
6 Id.
7 For the impact of such national border closures on international human rights law, see
generally, Bríd Ní Ghráinne, COVID-19, Border Closures, and International Law, INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PRAUGE (May 4, 2020) (arguing that border closures can be
compatible with international refugee and human rights law),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343255110_Covid19_Border_Closures_and_Interna
tional_Law.
8WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 4.
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foreign nationals arriving from that country. The same rules were
soon applied to persons who had been in Iran, South Korea and Italy.
During this time, the Australian States and Territories initiated
testing and contact tracing regimes, while hospital intensive care and
ventilator capacities were ramped up across the country. From 16
March 2020 all travelers arriving in Australia from any destination
were required to self-isolate for 14 days and on 20 March 2020 the
national border was entirely closed to non-residents and noncitizens.9
State borders were also closed to Australian citizens within Australia, and only
exempt travelers were allowed to enter. The germane example is that of Western
Australia, which
closed its borders at midnight on 5 April 2020 pursuant to the
Quarantine (Closing the Border) Directions, issued under the
Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) by the Commissioner of
Police and State Emergency Coordinator … The Directions prohibit
entry to Western Australia of anyone who does not qualify as an
“exempt traveler”, a category that includes, for example: military,
judicial and government officers; members of the Commonwealth
Parliament and their staff; invited health and emergency service
workers; transport, freight and logistics workers; fly-in-fly-out mine
workers; and people granted entry on compassionate grounds. The
Direction allows for conditions of entry to be imposed on any
exempt traveler, including requirements as to quarantine. Putting to
one side those categories of exempt traveler, and anyone benefitting
from the residual discretion to permit in other exceptional
circumstances, the Direction amounted to a “hard” border closure
– that is, non-residents were not given the option of undertaking selfquarantine or entering hotel quarantine, even at their own expense,
in order to earn the right of entry.10
9

See Nicholas Aroney & Michael Boyce, Australia and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Federal,
State and Local Responses 1 (Nov. 11, 2020), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3728488; See
also, Eleanor Roy, New Zealand and Australia close borders to foreigners amid coronavirus
crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/new-zealand-closes-borders-to-foreignersamid-coronavirus-crisis; see generally, Australia blocks arrival of all non-citizens, nonresidents in expanded coronavirus travel ban, ABC NEWS (May 12, 2020),
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-19/coronavirus-non-resident-travel-banaustralia/12071640; Roy G. Beran, Editorial: The COVID Pandemic - The Good, the Bad and
the Ugly, 39 MED. & L. 89, 92 (2020) (“The lessons learnt will directly influence future
management of pandemics, with: possible more rapid restriction of international travel.”); Roy
G. Beran, The Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic in Australia – History and Potential
Lessons, 39 MED. & L. 97, 100-103 (2020) (chronicling Australia’s response to COVID-19
from late January 2020 to mid-May 2020, including border closures in Western Australia).
10 See Amelia Simpson, “We are not Epidemiologists”: COVID-19 in the High Court, 31
PUB. L. REV. 1 (2020). See generally, Benjamin Gubana, WA Closes its Borders for the First
Time in History to Stop Coronavirus Spread. How Will This Work?, ABC NEWS (Apr. 3,
2020), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-03/wa-closes-borders-to-stop-coronavirustravel-ban-explained/12116140.
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Based on evidence provided by epidemiological and public health experts, these
border closures proved to be critical in preventing the spread of COVID-19 at
the state and national levels. 11 As of early January 2021, the total number of
cases in Australia was 28,595 and the total number of total deaths was 909.12 As
a fraction of the total population, the number of total deaths is around 0.004
percent. Similarly, as of early January 2021, the number of cases in Western
Australia was 875 with only nine deaths, or 0.00035 deaths per 100 inhabitants.
In contrast, in New South Wales and Victoria, the two States that decided not to
close their borders,13 and their combined number of cases were 25,417 with 874
deaths, which is significantly higher, even given their higher population density
relative to the other States.
In the United States, state-imposed restrictions in response to the COVID-19
pandemic were also introduced through emergency measures intended to
control the spread of the pandemic by curtailing the right to interstate travel.
Some governors tightened their borders, but all stopped short from introducing
hard border closures, opting instead for quarantine measures. 14 For example,
Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed executive orders imposing a fourteen-day
mandatory self-quarantine on travelers coming to Texas from hotspots.15 While
these state interventions seem to violate the essence of the federal compact in
the United States, in comparison, the Governor of Western Australia went
further, imposing hard border closures that prevented people from entering into
the State. Each State and Territory developed their own set of entry

11

Palmer v. State of Western Australia (No 4) [2020] FCA 1221 (25 August 2020) [71], [79];
Cf., Nicholas Aroney & Michael Boyce, supra note 9, at 28 (noting that the evidence “did not
take into consideration the economic, social and individual impacts of the border closures,
even though these latter factors could be relevant to a determination of whether the measures
were reasonably proportionate” and that the evidence did not distinguish “between the
probability of infection and the impact on human health in terms of morbidity and mortality”).
12 Coronavirus (COVID-19) Current Situation and Case Numbers, DEP’T. OF HEALTH (Jan. 8,
2021), https://www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-healthalert/coronavirus-covid-19-current-situation-and-case-numbers.
13

Kim Moloney & Susan Moloney, Australian Quarantine Policy: From Centralization to
Coordination with Mid-Pandemic COVID-19 Shifts, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 671, 677 (2020).
[hereinafter Kim Moloney & Susan Moloney]
14 Ian Millhiser, Governors are starting to tighten their borders. The implications are
staggering, VOX (Mar 28, 2020, 8:30am EDT),
https://www.vox.com/2020/3/28/21196934/greg-abbott-texas-closed-borders-travel-banconstitution-trump.
15 Exec. Order No. GA-11 relating to airport screening and self-quarantine during the
COVID-19 disaster, https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA11_airport_travel_reporting_COVID-19_IMAGE_03-26-2020.pdf; Exec. Order No GA-12
relating to roadway screening and self-quarantine during the COVID-19 disaster,
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA-12_roadway_quarantine_for_COVID19_IMAGE_03-29-2020.pdf.
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requirements.16 Intra and interstate controls reflected the latest evidence of
community transmission within each jurisdiction:
Replicating subnational border closures during the Spanish flu,
Tasmania (March 19) and Northern Territory (March 21) were the
first to implement hard border closures. The closures refused entry
to the state/territory even for some of its residents. Such closures
were not recommended by the AHMPPI [Australian Health
Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza], and yet on March 24,
South Australia also closed its borders, Queensland followed on
March 25, and Western Australia on April 6. The only states with no
hard border closures are the most populous, New South Wales and
Victoria, despite both having higher community spread than the
other states/territories combined. Although not closed they are
effectively enclosed (to other states but not to each other) given
closures and domestic travel bans elsewhere. Internal border
closures were not publicly opposed by the Commonwealth
government. This creates an impression of Australia protecting itself
against international outsiders as well as the rest of Australia
protecting itself against the 58 percent of Australians who live in
New South Wales and Victoria. 17
In contrast, the United States did not close neither its federal nor state borders,
although some restrictions have been implemented at both levels. 18 As of 10
January 2021, the United States has 21,761,186 confirmed cases and 365,886
deaths. That is a death rate of around 0.1115 percent, 28 times higher than that
in Australia. hile there are important geographic and demographic differences
between the two counties,19 a critical question still emerges, namely, whether
pandemic State border closures similar to those seen in Western Australia can
be implemented as a first line of defense in the United States.
Historically, there were hard state border closures—but only briefly. For
example, Texas closed its border with Louisiana following reports of yellow
fever in New Orleans:

16

State and Territory Border Closures, AUSTRALIAN INTERSTATE QUARANTINE
https://www.interstatequarantine.org.au/state-and-territory-border-closures/ (last visited Oct.
3, 2021).
17 Kim Moloney & Susan Moloney, supra note 13.
18 See, e.g., National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division
of Viral Diseases, Travelers Prohibited from Entry to the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Sept. 14, 2020) https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/travelers/from-other-countries.html; Domestic travel restrictions can be accessed from
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Domestic Travel During the COVID-19
Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Dec. 2, 2020)
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-during-covid19.html.
19 For example, the fact that Australia is an island continent with a population density of 8 per
square mile, compared to a total U.S. land border of around 6,000 miles (excluding the
Alaska-Canada border), and a density of 90 per square mile in the United States.
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[O]n or about the 31st day of August, 1899, a case of yellow fever
was officially declared to exist in the City of New Orleans … as soon
as said first case was reported, the said William F. Blunt, Health
Officer of the State of Texas, claiming to act under the provisions of
Article 4324 of the Revised Civil Statutes, under the pretense of
establishing a quarantine, placed an embargo on all interstate
commerce between the City of New Orleans and the State of Texas,
absolutely prohibiting all common carriers entering the State of
Texas from bringing into the state any freight or passengers, or even
the mails of the United States, coming from the City of New Orleans,
and to enforce these orders he immediately placed, and now
maintains, armed guards, acting under the authority of the State of
Texas, on all the lines of travel from the State of Louisiana into the
State of Texas, with instructions to enforce the embargo declared by
him vi et armis, which instructions these armed guards are carrying
out to the letter; that about six days later, he modified his order so as
to permit the government of the United States to carry and deliver
the mails, and also modified his order so as to permit persons and
their baggage to enter the State of Texas, after ten days’ detention at
the quarantine detention camps established by him, and after
fumigation of their baggage; but that he now maintains, and
announces his intention to maintain indefinitely his absolute
prohibition of all interstate commerce between the City of New
Orleans and the State of Texas … 20
Note however, that the 1899 hard border closure lasted only for six days and
was replaced by a state-run quarantine regime. Notwithstanding, Louisiana
challenged the border closure arguing that it was unnecessary to protect public
health and that it was designed to benefit cities in Texas at the expense of
commerce with New Orleans.21 The Court decided that it did not have original
jurisdiction to hear the case. 22
The topic of subnational borders has received little attention in the social
sciences;23 the same can be said about the role of subnational borders in
contemporary research on federalism. 24 In fact, some have suggested that such
20

Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 4 (1900) (emphasis added).
See Polly J. Price, Epidemics, Outsiders, and Local Protection: Federalism Theater in the
Era of the Shotgun Quarantine, 19 J. CONST. L. 369, 393 (2016).
22 176 U.S. at 23 (“Finally, we are unable to hold that the bill may be maintained as
presenting a case of controversy between a state and citizens of another state. Jurisdiction over
controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and,
where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a
state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion
and judgment.”).
23 Maano Ramutsindela, Placing Subnational Borders in Border Studies, 101 SOUTH AFRICAN
GEOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL 349 (2019) (arguing that research on borders given little attention to
the role of subnational borders in modern governance).
24 There is a growing literature on subnational constitutionalism. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg &
Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583 (2010); Patricia Popelier,
Subnational Multilevel Constitutionalism, 6 PERSP. ON FED. E1 (2014). However, emphasis in
this literature is on comparative analyses of the constitutional designed found at the
21
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borders are no longer relevant. For example, Jessica Bulman-Pozen argues that
American federalism is evolving away from the constitutional design dividing
powers between the federal government and the States, and towards a partisan
federalism that ensures the porosity of state borders. 25 Davia Cox Downey and
William Myers evince this bipartisan federalism in the context of the United
States response to COVID-19: “Vertical collaboration and horizontal
collaborative efforts in the United States have largely been on partisan lines,
reflecting the limitations of American-style executive federalism in the face of
a global pandemic.”26 Even in the face of these inefficiencies, the response to
the COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated just how critical subnational
governments are in preventing the spread of this pandemic. 27 The declaration of
a state of emergency by state governments allowed for prophylactic policies
such as: non-symptomatic testing, use of personal protection equipment such as
face masks, school closures, social distancing and social gathering limitations,
home-bound policies such as working-from-home requirements, curfews and
lockdowns; mandatory quarantine policies, including self-isolation; closure of
non-essential businesses and services, including closure of restaurants and
reduced public transportation services.28 However, hard state border closures,
arguably the most effective measure in reducing the risk of community
transmission, was not implemented consistently in the three great AngloAmerican federations, the United States, Canada, and Australia. We find in
Australia the full potential of hard closures that obviated the need for measures
such as curfews and shutdowns, and thus prevented the onset of much of the
grim economic consequences brought by these measures.29

subnational level, rather than the role of subnational borders in forging an independent
subnational constitutional identity.
25 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014). Cf.,
James A. Gardner, Federalism and Subnational Political Community, 127 HARV. L. REV. F.
153 (2014).
26 Davia Cox Downey & William M. Myers, Federalism, Intergovernmental Relationships,
and Emergency Response: A Comparison of Australia and the United States, 50 AM. REV.
PUB. ADMIN. 526, 532 (2020).
27 See, e.g., Abdul Basit Adeel et al., COVID-19 Policy Response and the Rise of the SubNational Governments, 46 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 565 (2020).
28 Id. at 567.
29
In Canada, the residuum of powers rests with the federal government, while the Provinces
have primary responsibility for public health. Hence, while any attempt by a Province to
enforce hard border closures on inter-provincial travel is ultra vires, there is an inherent
balancing in introducing these closures in response to a pandemic. See Emmett Macfarlane,
Public Policy and Constitutional Rights in Times of Crisis, 53 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 299, 300
(2020); Sujit Choudhry, COVID-19 & The Canadian Constitution, CANLII CONNECTS (July
10, 2020) https://www.canliiconnects.org/en/commentaries/71478 (arguing that the lack of a
national agency for public health has not diminished the effectiveness of cooperation between
the federal and provincial governments in responding to the pandemic). See also, Benjamen
Franklen Gussen, Reflections on La Fata Morgana: Watsonian “prestige” and Bagehotian
“efficiency”, 12 J. COM. L. 80 (2017) (arguing that Canadian federalism is moving towards a
shift of these residuum powers to the Provinces); Colleen M. Flood et al., Reconciling civil
liberties and public health in the response to COVID-19, 5 FACETS 887, 889 (2020) (“At
points during the outbreak, some provinces (New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island,
Newfoundland and Labrador and Quebec) have prohibited ‘non-essential’ travel (tourism and
social
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The key point is that Western Australia’s hard border closures were upheld by
the High Court of Australia as constitutional. 30 Does this outcome suggest that
similar hard state border closures would also be upheld in the United States and
Canada? This article focuses on analyzing the possibility of a similar outcome
in the United States.
In Australia, there have only been legal challenges to hard state border closures,
and only in response to COVID-19. Historically, similar state border closures
were implemented in response to the 1918 Spanish flu (H1N1) virus that
infected one-third of the world’s population. In January 1919, Queensland
closed its border with New South Wales in an effort to stop the spread of the
virus,31 notwithstanding the indignation of locals cut off from essential services,
joined by those unable to return home. Unlike the COVID-19 border closures,
however, the 1918 Spanish flu closures did not attract legal challenges. Nor did
supra- and substate restrictions on movement. Hence, while since March 20,
2020, Australia closed its international borders to all non-citizens and nonresidents,32 and metropolitan Melbourne was under Stage 4 mobility restrictions
from August 2 to October 28, 2020,33 these restrictions have not attracted
constitutional challenges, unlike State border closures.
In contrast, as of early October 2020, around 1,000 lawsuits have been filed
across the United States, challenging State and municipality-imposed
restrictions.34 Historically, emergency quarantine orders ordinarily have not
visits), implementing checkpoints at points of entry where travelers are questioned. More
recently, the
Atlantic provinces have established an ‘Atlantic bubble’, allowing residents of Newfoundland
and
Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick to travel without the 14day quarantine
imposed on visitors from non-Atlantic provinces”). As for the territories, they can impose
such hard border closures because they are controlled directly by the federal government. See,
e.g., Katie Toth, NWT to close borders to all inbound travel by air, land and port – with
limited exceptions, CBC NEWS (20
March 2020), http://cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nwt-travel-ban-covid19-1.5505505 (reporting
on hard border closures in the Northwest Territories in response to the COVID-19 pandemic).
30 See Palmer v Western Australia (2021) 95 ALJR 229 (Austl.). The High Court of Australia
(HCA) applied a proportionality analysis to the interstate mobility right in section 92 of the
Australian Constitution.
31Bern Young & Elise Kinsella, The Deadly Spanish Flu and a Dramatic Border Closure
Remembered 100 Years On, ABC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2019) https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-0205/the-deadly-spanish-flu-and-qld-nsw-border-closure-100-years-on/10781296.
32 Prime Minister of Australia, Border Restrictions, Media Release (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.pm.gov.au/media/border-restrictions.
33 Victoria State Government, Stage 4 Restrictions, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (last
updated May 10, 2021), https://www.dhhs.vic.gov.au/stage-4-restrictions-covid-19. Unless
exceptions relating to work or medical and caregiving reasons apply, Stage 4 restrictions
impose a curfew from 8pm until 5am, and limit movement away from home to a radius of 5
kms. See also, Lockdown restrictions lift in Melbourne, THE AGE (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/lockdown-restrictions-lift-in-melbourne20201028-h1rqdi.html.
34 Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, Legal Challenges to State COVID-19
Orders, ASTHO REPORT (October 2020),
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been found to infringe individual constitutional rights.35 Over the last century,
however, individual liberties such as interstate travel have become salient. This
evolution in federal constitutional law suggests that while a health emergency
can provide justification for State restrictions, their constitutionality does not
rest on State broad police powers, but on traditional judicial scrutiny. 36
The relevant research question, namely, whether state border closures similar to
those seen in Western Australia can be implemented in the United State, is broad
and touches on a number of disciplines. Therefore, this article will only focus
on the constitutional aspect of hard state borders. There could still be other
hurdles that prevent the introduction of such closures in the United States, at
least in many States, or even if implemented, makes these border closures less
effective than those in Australia. But without ascertaining the constitutionality
of such closures, further analysis of their efficacy would be a moot point.
In addition, I focus only on the tension between hard state border closures and
the right to interstate travel. Arguments based on burdening interstate commerce
can be reduced to the same analytical structure of interstate mobility under strict
scrutiny.37 The fact that the effect of hard state border closures on interstate
commerce is only incidental pivots the analysis towards a balancing exercise of
the compelling state interest behind the closures and the net benefit from the
closures. In the context of responses to COVID-19, the burden of hard state
border closures is likely to be upheld as constitutional. For example, in Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis.,38 Madison passed an ordinance requiring
local pasteurization of all milk sold in the city. Dean Milk, an Illinois milk
producer, challenged the constitutionality of this ordinance under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, arguing that the ordinance was intended to protect local
industries in Madison. A six-to-three majority of the Supreme Court agreed,
finding the requirement for local pasteurization discriminated against interstate
commerce. Justice Clark, who delivered the majority opinion explained that “In
thus erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against
competition from without the State, Madison plainly discriminates against

https://www.astho.org/generickey/GenericKeyDetails.aspx?contentid=22924&folderid=5156
&catid=7203.
35 See David B. Salmons, et al., Constitutional Challenges to State Actions in Response to
COVID-19, MORGAN LEWIS LAWFLASH (May 11, 2020)
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2020/05/constitutional-challenges-to-state-actions-inresponse-to-covid-19-cv19-lf.
36 See Jefferey D. Jackson, Tiered Scrutiny in a Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 39, 40 (2020).
37
See Palmer v. Western Australia (2021) 95 ALJR, ¶¶ 241-242 ¶¶ 45, 48, 50 (Kiefel CJ and
Keane J), 249 ¶ 92, 253 ¶ 114 (Gageler J), ¶ (Gordon J) ALJR 229 (Austl.).
38 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349 (1951).

10

interstate commerce”. 39 In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,40 the Supreme Court
struck down an Illinois statute requiring contour instead of customary straight
rear fender mudguards to be installed on trucks and trailers operated on its
highways. In delivering the Supreme Court opinion, Justice Douglas illustrated
the requisite public safety effect of the impugned law as a net balancing
analysis.41 The approach suggests a compelling state interest analysis, as found
under the first prong of strict scrutiny. The second prong, however, will take
into account the availability of less restrictive alternatives. In this sense, when
analyzing the constitutionality of hard state border closures, the challenge to
these closures from infringements on interstate travel encompass any
discriminatory burden on interstate commerce.
The same argument applies to the first guarantee of section 92 under the
Australian Constitution. The meaning of “trade and commerce” in section 92 is
the same as that in section 51(i) (trade and commerce power). 42 To ascertain
whether a legislative or administrative action does in fact infringe the first
guarantee in section 92, the interest underlying the said action has to be analyzed
against the protectionist effect of the legislation. A two-stage approach applies
to ascertaining whether an action infringes the freedom afforded trade and
commerce.43 The first is whether the legislative or administration action (by the
Commonwealth, a State or a Territory) is discriminatory on its face, that is, in
its legal operation. The second is whether the factual operation of the action
produced the discriminatory result. The starting point for analyzing the limit on
legislative and executive action under the first element of section 92 is to
analyze the nature of the impugned state law, to ascertain whether it has any
39

Id. at 354. See also Id. at 357-58 (Black, J., dissenting, with whom Justices Douglas and
Minton concurred, clarified the requisite discriminatory burden “Characterization of s 7.21 as
a ‘discriminatory burden’ on interstate commerce is merely a statement of the Court’s result,
which I think incorrect. The section does prohibit the sale of milk in Madison by interstate and
intrastate producers who prefer to pasteurize over five miles distant from the city. But both
state courts below found that s 7.21 represents a good-faith attempt to safeguard public health
by making adequate sanitation inspection possible. While we are not bound by these findings,
I do not understand the Court to overturn them. Therefore, the fact that s 7.21, like all health
regulations, imposes some burden on trade, does not mean that it ‘discriminates’ against
interstate commerce”.
40 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959) (“The regulation of highways ‘is
akin to quarantine measures, same laws, and like local regulations of rivers, harbors, piers,
and docks, with respect to which the state has exceptional scope for the exercise of its
regulatory power, and which, Congress not acting, have been sustained even though they
materially interfere with interstate commerce.’ These safety measures carry a strong
presumption of validity when challenged in court. If there are alternative ways of solving a
problem, we do not sit to determine which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state
objective. Policy decisions are for the state legislature, absent federal entry into the field.
Unless we can conclude on the whole record that ‘the total effect of the law as a safety
measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh
the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously
impede it’ we must uphold the statute”) (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. State of Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 775-76, 783 (1915)).
41 Id. at 530.
42 James v Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1, 60 (Austl.).
43 Cole v Whitfield (Tasmanian Crayfish case) (1988) 165 CLR 360, 399.
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protectionist effect that singles out interstate trade and commerce.44 In addition,
section 92 will prevent non-fiscal controls to interstate trade where those
controls protect intrastate trade against competition, regardless of whether that
discrimination is expressed in legal form or is the result of the practical effect
of these controls.45 However, where the law has only an incidental protectionist
effect, the interference with trade and commerce will be upheld as constitutional
if it is appropriate and adapted to the resolution of the problems identified by
the legislature or the executive, and the burden imposed on interstate trade is
not disproportionate to that resolution. 46
In summary, in the context of public health safety, the challenges to hard state
border closures based on discriminatory burden on interstate commerce can be
incorporated in arguing that the constitutionality of such closures as
unnecessary restrictions on the right to interstate travel in the context of public
health safety. I therefore focus the analysis on the judicial review framework
relevant to this right. I look at the constitutionality of hard state border closures
as a prophylactic response to a pandemic.
In addition, I use the recent COVID-19 pandemic to contextualize the analysis,
particularly in relation to recent High Court of Australia (HCA) jurisprudence
upholding such closures. Australian jurisprudence has historical parallels with
the United States in terms of the effect of federation on eliminating commercial
protectionism, and the requisite interstate intercourse needed to give effect to
the free trade.47 However, I concede that “[n]o single, simple formula predicts
how U.S. courts might go about amplifying and regularizing the elements of
proportionality that already exist, sometimes partially buried, in our doctrine.”48
Nevertheless, by analyzing parallels between recent HCA jurisprudence and the
current tiered approach in this country, I hope to provide guidance on the
availability of hard state border closures in response to a pandemic.
The article is structured as follows. Part II analyzes the nature of the right to
interstate travel, to motivate the use in Part III of strict scrutiny as the standard
44

Id. at 408.
Id. at 399; Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436 (Austl.); See
also Cole v Whitfield (Tasmanian Crayfish case) (1988) 165 CLR 408 (“if a law …
discriminates against interstate trade and commerce in pursuit of [an] object in a way or to an
extent which warrants characterization of the law as protectionist, a court will be justified in
concluding that it [offends section 92]”).
46 See generally, Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436 (Austl.);
see also Cunliffe v Commonwealth (Migration Agents Case) (1994) 182 CLR 272 (Austl.).
47 See, e.g., Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 387 (Austl.) (referring to intercolonial free
trade as a “lion in the path” of federation); H. P. Hood and Sons Inc. v Du Mond 336 U.S.
525, 533-534 (1949) (arguing that State protectionism is a threat to the safety and peace of the
Union); Cf., Stone, supra note 47, at 463 (Notwithstanding, there is an “overriding difference
between the Australian and American Constitutions [that] resides … not in their provisions,
but in the comparative youth of the Australian Constitution, as against the American, which is
the oldest of ‘going’ written constitutions. This difference in constitutional maturity is
accentuated by the industrial and demographic immaturity of the Australian economy”).
48 Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and
the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L. J. 797, 864 (2011).
45
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for judicial review of border closures. Part IV and Part V delineate the analysis
of the two elements forming the structural common denominator for the
constitutional analysis in the United States and Australia, namely, the
justificatory doctrine of necessity and its requirement of the existence of an
emergency, for state restrictions to be the only reasonable response to the
emergency. The last part, Part VI, furnishes some final thoughts on the
constitutionality of hard state border closures in the United States.
II.

THE RIGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL

To ascertain the constitutionality of hard state border closures in the United
States, we must first ascertain the nature of the right to interstate travel. In this
part, I argue that this right is a fundamental right. In the next part, the
understanding of this right motivates an analysis of strict scrutiny, the judicial
review standard that the Supreme Court will use to analyze the constitutionality
of hard state border closures, given the fundamental nature of the infringed
right. The next step is to analyze the right to interstate travel under the
Australian Constitution to help inform the potential constitutionality of Western
Australian-style border closures in the United States, by revealing the common
analytical structure under each constitution.
A. As an Inferred Fundamental Right
Given that there is no explicit guarantee of interstate travel in the U.S.
Constitution as found in section 92 of the Australian Constitution, the analytical
framework for analyzing the constitutionality of hard state border closures turns
on whether interstate travel can be interpreted as a fundamental right. If it is a
fundamental right, “Courts [will] use strict scrutiny to judge the constitutional
validity of legislation infringing on fundamental rights under the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments.”49
While the rationale for interstate travel is as fundamental as protecting the
cohesiveness of the Union, 50 the right is not explicitly set forth in the U.S.
Constitution.51 Perhaps, it is because the right is so elementary to the notion of
a union that the founding fathers did not see a need to have it stated explicitly. 52
49

Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 862-63 (2006).
50 See Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Interpretation, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 433, 445
(1999). See also, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) (explaining that the right to
interstate mobility “was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the
stronger union the Constitution created”).
51 See Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Constitutional Protection for Freedom of Movement: A Time
for Decision, 57 KY. L. J. 417, 417 (1969); Kathryn E. Wilhelm, Freedom of Movement at a
Standstill - Toward the Establishment of a Fundamental Right to Intrastate Travel, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 2461, 2466-67 (2010) (arguing that the right to interstate travel lacks any “textual basis
in the Constitution”).
52 Kathryn E. Wilhelm, Freedom of Movement at a Standstill - Toward the Establishment of a
Fundamental Right to Intrastate Travel, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2461, 2462 (2010) (arguing that the
right to free movement “so obvious that few would expect it ever to be challenged”). Note,
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After all, the right is “part of American heritage,” 53 and traces its origins to
England, where personal liberty is a birthright. 54 It could also be that at the time
of federation, there were no major issues with interstate mobility. 55
However, the lack of textual evidence in the U.S. Constitution on the right to
interstate travel has not prevented the Supreme Court from asserting its
fundamental character, as early as 1849. In Smith v. Turner,56 the Court stated
that
we are one people with one common country. We are all citizens of
the United States, and as members of the same community must
have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without
interruption, as freely as in our own states. 57
In fact, the right has had a precise formulation since the 18th century. William
Blackstone expresses the right as “the power of locomotion, of changing
situation, or of moving one’s person to whatsoever place one’s inclination may
direct without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due process of law”. 58
Blackstone’s formulation suggests three different versions of the right to free
travel.59 The first is the right to cross boundaries without deterrence
(locomotion). The second is the right to leave your present location and go
elsewhere (change situation). The third is the right to settle in a given location
(moving to whatever place). This three-component formulation has also been
adopted by the Supreme Court in Saenz v. Rae,60 where the right is understood
as “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right
to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to
become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that
State”.61 Hard state border closures similar to those implemented in Western
Australia infringe the first component by preventing the citizen of one State
from entering another State.

however, that Wilhelm uses the term “free movement” as synonymous to intrastate travel,
rather than interstate travel.
53
See Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Constitutional Protection for Freedom of Movement: A Time
for Decision, 57 KY. L. J. 417, 420 (1969).
54 See Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499, 505 (1882).
55 See Steinbach, supra note 53, at 420. See generally, Note, Passports and Freedom of
Travel: The Conflict of a Right and a Privilege, 41 GEO. L. J. 63, 71 (1952).
63, 71 (1952).
56 Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
57 Id. at 492.
58 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 134 (Lewis 3d ed. 1902).
59 Steinbach, supra note 53, at 418.
60 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 490 (1999).
61 Id. at 500; see also, Chavez v. Illinois State Police 251 F.3d 612, 649 (7th Cir. 2001) (“the
right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave another state” prohibits “direct impairment of
the right to move between the states”).
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It follows that the source of this right has to be inferred from a combination of
other constitutional safeguards, namely, the conception of a national
citizenship, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses under Article IV, § 2, cl. 1
and under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause under Article I, §
8, the Due Process Clauses under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. 62
For example, in 1941, the Court confirmed the status of interstate travel as “a
right fundamental to the national character of our Federal government.” 63 By
the end of the 20th century, national citizenship, the primary signifier of this
character, ensured upholding the rights of U.S. citizens against infringement by
the States.64 This concept of nationhood has also influenced the earliest
statement confirming the existence of a right to interstate travel flowing from
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “no
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States”. In its early jurisprudence on the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court limited the scope of this Clause to
regulating the relationship between citizens and the federal government. 65
However, in 1908, the Court held that “among the rights and privileges of
National citizenship recognized by this court is the right to pass freely from
State to State.”66 Similarly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause under Article
IV, § 2 states that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States”. In its early jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court interpreted this Clause to give the citizens of each State “the
right of free ingress into other States and egress from the right of free ingress
into other States.”67 On the one hand, in 1942, the Supreme Court has limited
62See

Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1990). See also, Steinbach, supra
note 53, at 421; Wilhelm, supra note 52, at 2466-67.
63 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941).
64 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (arguing that the right to interstate travel “is
protected not only by the new arrival’s status as a state citizen, but also by her status as a
citizen of the United States”).
65 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78-79 (1873) (arguing for the existence of a national
character that gave the federal government the power to regulate the privileges and
immunities clause).
66
Twining v. State of N.J., 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
67See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868). See also, Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution derives from
art. IV, para. 1 of the Articles of Confederation); Saenz v. Roe, U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (“[the
right to interstate travel] was expressly mentioned in the text of the Articles of
Confederation”); and U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) (“Although the Articles of
Confederation provided that ‘the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other State,’ that right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason,
it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a
necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.”). Article IV, para. 1
provides an explicit statement of all three elements of Blackstone’s formulation of the right to
interstate travel: “the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the
same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively”. See
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. See also, Andrew C. Porter, Comment,
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its scope to State discrimination. 68 In United States v. Wheeler,69 a case where
two hundred and twenty-one citizens of the United States were forcibly
removed from Arizona to New Mexico, the Court designated the right as
fundamental.70
The Supreme Court has also pronounced that the Privileges and immunities
Clause “plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of
one State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade,
or business without molestation.”71 This dictum links the right to interstate
travel to the Commerce Clause. The Clause gives to Congress “the power to
regulate commerce … among the several states.” 72 In 1941, the Supreme Court
indicated that “Article I, § 8 of the Constitution delegates to the Congress the
authority to regulate interstate commerce. And it is settled beyond question that
the transportation of persons is ‘commerce,’ within the meaning of that
provision.”73 However, the Commerce Clause preserves to the States the power
to regulate interstate travel under quarantine laws. The most relevant case is
Zemel v. Rusk,74 where Chief Justice Warren stated that interstate travel as
guaranteed under the commerce clause,
does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence cannot
be quarantined when it can be demonstrated that unlimited travel to
the area would directly and materially interfere with the safety and
welfare of the area or the nation as a whole. 75
Hence, under the Commerce Clause, the right to interstate travel is not absolute,
and can be regulated by the States. However, Congress also has the power to
regulate this right, and can hence override the States.

Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 820,
821-22 (1992) (analyzes the origins of interstate travel in the Articles of Confederation).
68See, e.g., Comment, State Control of Interstate Migration of Indigents, 40 MICH. L. REV.
711, 718 (1942); Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939) (arguing that the
scope of the clause is limited to protection from discrimination by one State against the
citizens from other States).
69
254 U.S. 281 (1920).
70
Id. at 293 (Chief Justice White) (“[i]n all the States from the beginning down to the
adoption of the Articles of Confederation the citizens thereof possessed the fundamental right,
inherent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their
respective States, to move at will from the limits of their respective States, to move from place
to place therein, to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom, with a consequent authority
in the States to punish violations of this fundamental right”) (emphasis added). See also,
Commonwealth v. Milton, 51 Ky. 212, 218 (1851) (arguing that the Constitution secures the
right of interstate travel); Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499, 505 (1882) (arguing that the
freedom of egress and ingress is an implication of the Federal as well as State Constitutions).
71 Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 430 (1870) (Justice Clifford).
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
73 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941).
74 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
75 Id. at 15-16.
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Additionally, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Supreme Court found the
right to interstate travel emanated from the Due Process under both the Fifth
and the Fourteenth Amendments, which ensures that “no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process.”76 Zachariah Chafee
has suggested that the right to interstate travel “is best seen in due process
terms” given that “the ‘liberty’ of all human beings which cannot be taken away
without due process of law includes liberty of speech, press, assembly, religion,
and also liberty of movement.”77 One of the earliest cases confirming Due
Process as a source for interstate travel is Williams v. Fears,78 where the Court
held that liberty
is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling79
In Kent v. Dulles,80 the Court held that “The right to travel is part of the ‘liberty’
of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment.”81 Similarly, in Aptheker v. Sec’y of State,82 the Court held
that a legislation that indiscriminately restricts the right to travel will infringe
the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 83 In United States v. Guest,84
Justice Harlan also found the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to be a source of the right to interstate travel. 85
Arguably, the clearest pronouncement of the right to interstate travel came
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1966,
Vivian Thompson changed her residence from Boston, Massachusetts to
Hartford, Connecticut to be close to her mother. When she eventually applied
for welfare assistance in Connecticut, her application was rejected on the ground
that she has not resided in the State for the minimum period of one-year
stipulated for under State legislation. In the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut a three-to-one majority found the chilling effect on
interstate travel created by the one-year residency requirement to violate the
Equal Protection Clause. On appeal to the Supreme Court agreed with the
District Court, finding the waiting period to be unconstitutional under the Equal
76

See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (“The right to travel is part of the ‘liberty’ of
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment”); Aptheker v. Sec. of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (arguing that a legislation
that indiscriminately restricts the right to travel will infringe the liberty guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment).
77 Zechariah Chafee, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 185, 192-193
(Univ. of Kan. Press 1956).
78 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
79 Id. at 274.
80 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
81 Id. at 125.
82 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
83 Id. at 505.
84 383 U.S. 745 (1965).
85 d. at 769-70.
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Protection Clause. In Shapiro v. Thompson,86 the Court stated that “the
fundamental right of interstate movement … must be judged by the stricter
standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest,”87 adding that “…
the nature of our Federal Union … require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes … which
unreasonably burden or restrict their movement.”88
In summary, regardless of source, the right to interstate travel has been
recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right. In the next part, Part
III, this recognition will motivate the strict scrutiny analysis that the Supreme
Court is likely to apply in ascertaining the constitutionality of hard border
restrictions on this right.
B. As an Express Guarantee
The right to interstate mobility is found in sections 92 and 117 of the Australian
Constitution.89 Section 92 states that: “On the imposition of uniform duties of
customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means
of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free”. 90 Section 117
states that:
A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in
any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not
be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen
resident in such other State. 91
Below, I delineate the origin of these sections to inform our understanding of
the right to interstate travel under the Australian Constitution.
Section 92 has no equivalent in the U.S. Constitution, 92 at least not an explicit
statement of an absolute right to interstate intercourse. The section is based on
the design in the Canadian Constitution, in particular, section 121 of the British
North America Act, 1867,93 stating that: “All articles of the growth, produce, or
manufacture of any one of the Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be
admitted free into each of the other Provinces.” 94 On the other hand, section 117
comes directly from the U.S. Constitution, based on Article IV, § 2: “The
86

394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 671 (1974). See also, Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez 476 U.S. 898, 903
(1986)(Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
87 394 U.S. at 637.
88 Id. at 629.
89 Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900 (Imp), 63 & 64 Victoria, c. 12, s 9 (U.K.) [hereafter,
Australian Constitution].
90 Australian Constitution s 92.
91 Australian Constitution s 117.
92 Stone, supra note 47, at 470.
93
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 5
(Can.).
94 Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 5, s 121 (Can.).
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citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States.”95 When this article is read with Article 1, § 8, which
allows Congress to regulate interstate trade, and the Fourteenth Amendment that
provides that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, these provisions have an effect
similar to that of sections 92 and 117 of the Australian Constitution. 96
Therefore, we can analyze section 92, as illustrated in Palmer v. Western
Australia, as relating to the current (strict scrutiny) judicial review framework
in the United States.97 In the context of hard border closures during COVID-19,
the relevance of Australian jurisprudence comes from how the interpretation of
section 92 has been informed by U.S. jurisprudence:
It does seem in fact that Australian constitutional review is similar
to that practiced in the United States prior to 1936 and that, as
McWhinney suggests, S. 92 has been converted into an “Australian
due process clause”. 98
Similarly, Julius Stone has suggested that section 92 “is coming to be
interpreted to include tacitly within itself a guarantee of individual freedom of
contract and choice of vocation of persons operating within the field of interstate
commerce.”99 Section 92 therefore functions as a restraint on federal power in
the way the due process and contract clauses function in the United States. The
parallels, however, are imperfect: “there is too much uncertainty and there are
too many strands in the interpretation of Sec. 92 to make it possible to define its
scope and operation with any dogmatic assurance.” 100
Section 92 interstate intercourse has also been described by the High Court in
the following terms:
the creation of a federal union with one government and one
legislature in respect of national affairs assures to every free citizen

95

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
Zelman Cowan, A Comparison of the Constitutions of Australia and the United States, 4
BUFF. L. REV. 155, 174-75, 180 (1955).
97 Aurelien Portuese, Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency, 19
EUR. L. J. 612, 622 (2013).
98 P. W. Hutchins & P. J. Kenniff, The Concept of Interstate Commerce: A Case Study of
Judicial Review in Canada, the United States and Australia, 10 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT, 705,
727 (1969) (citing EDWARD MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
WORLD 81 (3rd ed. 2018) “It is perhaps characteristic that the judges of the High Court of
Australia should, in the spirit of Herbert Spencer’s social statics, have converted section 92 of
the Australian Constitution into an ‘Australian due process clause’ while at the same time
refusing to admit that social and economic considerations have any place in constitutional law
adjudication”).
99 Stone, supra note 47, at 511.
100 Cowan, supra note 96, at 180.
96
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the right of access to the institutions, and of due participation in the
activities of the nation.101
Moreover,
it is not essential that the means of movement be physically
perceptible … the expression of ideas, whether in literary or other
form, can be moved and a movement of that kind across State
borders is capable of attracting the operation of s 92.102
The protection of public health appears in the Australian Constitution in only
two locations: section 51(ix) and section 69. Section 51(ix) creates a concurrent
power that can be exercised by the Commonwealth and the States, although
under the supremacy clause in section 109, analogous to Article VI, clause 2,
the Commonwealth can decide to cover the field thus making its regulation of
quarantine exclusive. Section 51 (ix) states that “The Parliament shall, subject
to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the Commonwealth with respect to quarantine.”103 The Act gave
the Commonwealth the power to “supersede Quarantine measures under State
Acts.”104 The Commonwealth exercised this quarantine power in 1908, 105 by
passing a quarantine Act that allowed surveillance and control over Australia’s
borders. Similarly, section 69 states that “On a date or dates to be proclaimed
by the Governor-General after the establishment of the Commonwealth the
following departments of the public service in each State shall become
transferred to the Commonwealth … quarantine.”106 However, until this transfer
is proclaimed, the States continue to have the power to introduce their own
quarantine measures. Hence, while under the Act the Commonwealth can
declare a state of emergency, the States can still also declare an emergency due
to the same health crisis.107 Similarly, a state of disaster can be declared. The
difference between the declaration of a disaster and an emergency is one of
availability of resources to enable a control of the event. The former signals that
said resources are not available to the level of government declaring the disaster,
while available in the case of an emergency. 108 In terms of declaring a state of
disaster “the Commonwealth has legislative responsibility for taxation, postal
101

R v Smithers; Ex parte Benson (1912) 16 CLR 99, 109-10 (Austl.) (Barton J). See also
Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 69 (Austl.) (Dawson), 90 (Toohey), and 116
(Gaudron J).
102 Nationwide News Ort Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 56 (Austl.) (Brennan J).
103 Australian Constitution s 51(ix).
104
Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth) s 2A(1) (Austl.).
105 Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth) (Austl.).
106 Australian Constitution s 69.
107 See generally, K. Wilson et al., The New International Health Regulations and the
Federalism Dilemma, 3 PLOS MED. e1 (2005) (arguing that federalism hinders public health
responses); K. Wilson et al., Strategies for Implementing the New International Health
Regulations in Federal Countries, 86 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 215 (2008) (arguing for
regional governments to develop local public health capacity).
108See, e.g., The Difference Between Emergency and Disaster, CITY OF OXFORD,
https://www.oxnard.org/the-difference-between-emergency-and-disaster/.
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and telegraphic communications, defense (which is relevant to the use of the
defense force in disaster response), insurance and the payment of social security
benefits”.109
The incompleteness of the national emergency response framework became
evident during the policy response to the Spanish flu:
Not only was Australia unprepared, but state/territory and
Commonwealth disputes hampered coordinated responses. This
included the failure of a 1918 agreement in which only the
Commonwealth could declare interstate quarantine after notification
by a state/territory chief health officer of regional concerns. Once
the Commonwealth deemed interstate quarantine necessary, only the
Commonwealth and not the state/territory could manage the
response. When Victoria and New South Wales quibbled over
whether New South Wales had accurately diagnosed an influenza
epidemic, the situation devolved into “every State for itself”. Some
states closed, while others, such as Queensland, battled the
Commonwealth over whether soldiers could land at quarantine
stations, and still others, such as Western Australia, “seized the
trans-Australian trains”.110
However, the “every State for itself” approach was not necessarily due to
coordination failures. It is part of the canonical design for the Commonwealth
of Australia, reflecting a federal goldilocks zone. Similar to the U.S.
Constitution, the Australian Constitution does not have a framework of
emergency powers.111 Also similar to the U.S. Constitution, under section 107,
the Australian Constitution gives residual powers to the States. 112 Section 107
109

Michael Eburn, Responding to Catastrophic Natural Disasters and the Need for
Commonwealth Legislation, 10 CANBERRA L. REV. 81, 82 (2011).
110 Kim Moloney & Susan Moloney, supra note 13, at 672. See also, Holly Mclean & Ben
Huf, DEPARTMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVICES, PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA, Research Paper
No. 2, EMERGENCY POWERS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND COVID-19 (Aug. 2020) (outlining the
framework for emergency powers in Victoria).
111 H. P. LEE ET AL., EMERGENCY POWERS IN AUSTRALIA 6 (2nd ed. 2018). See Id. at 7
(“Because State Parliaments exercise plenary legislative powers, and are not bound to adhere
to their own constitutions, they are generally free to define ‘emergency’ as they see fit, and
confer emergency powers in conformity with that definition, without any significant
boundaries. To the extent that there are constitutional limits on State emergency powers, they
are imposed by the limited freedoms guaranteed by the Australian Constitution and, at the
margins, the requirement that Parliaments not permanently abdicate their legislative powers.
This means, essentially, that a State Parliament may redistribute legislative and executive
power as it deems necessary in response to a state of emergency that it is free to define”).
112 Australian Constitution s 107 (“Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has
become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the
Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as
at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the
State, as the case may be.”). Note that in Canada, even though the residual powers are vested
in the federal government, “The provinces have a legislative power to deal with emergencies
occurring within their own borders, in order to ensure the delivery of provincial services and
the continuation of the provincial government”; Eburn, supra note 109, at 94.
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was drafted with Amendment X in mind:113 “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people.”114 One of these powers is the power
to declare a state of emergency. 115 The COVID-19 pandemic presented the
federal government with a golden opportunity to consolidate its powers vis-àvis the States. This consolidation effort has already been unfolding even prior
to the pandemic. For example, in terms of public health, the 1908 Act has been
replaced by the Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional
Provisions) Act 2015.116 The 2015 Act has been described as “shift[ing] the
constitutional boundaries between the Commonwealth and States with respect
to civil emergencies.”117 It gives the Commonwealth powers so wide in relation
to quarantines and the declaration of a state of emergency,118 that some describe
the Act as “an unprecedented expansion of power by the federal executive.” 119
In addition to the 2015 Act, the response to COVID-19 was coordinated at the
national level by the Communicable Disease Network Australia and a newly
created National Cabinet. 120 The latter signaled the federal government’s
intention to take its consolidation effort much further. The Cabinet was formed
on 13 March 2020. It is led by the Commonwealth Prime Minister and
composed of all State Premiers and Territory Chief Ministers. On 29 May 2020,
113

See JOHN QUICK & ROBERT GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 1136 (revised ed. 2015).
114 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
115 For example,
in New South Wales, s 4 of the Public Health Act 1991 (NSW) provides that where
a “state of emergency” has been declared under the State Emergency and Rescue
Management Act 1989 (NSW), and the Minister for Health (in consultation with
the Minister for Emergency Services) decides on “reasonable grounds that the
emergency could result” in a situation where the health of the public is, or is likely
to be at risk, the Minister can direct that certain actions be taken to deal with the
risk and the Minister may take action to avert the risk. This may include directing
persons in a specified area or group to submit to medical examinations. Section 5
provides that in cases falling short of an emergency, but where the Minister
considers “on reasonable grounds that a situation has arisen in which the health of
the public is at risk, or is likely to be at risk,” the Minister may take action and
give directions to deal with the risk and its possible consequences. Action that
may be taken includes any measures the Minister considers necessary to reduce
and remove the risk in an area, to segregate or isolate inhabitants, and prevent or
restrict access to an area.
Christopher Reynolds, Quarantine in times of emergency: The scope of s 51(ix) of the
Constitution, 12 J. L. & MED. 166, 174 (2004) (citations omitted).
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Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act 2015 (Cth)
(Austl.).
117 H. P. LEE ET AL., supra note 111, at 170.
118 Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act 2015 (Cth) Pts
4 and 6 (Austl.).
119 Stephanie Brenker, An Executive Grab for Power During COVID-19?, AUSTL. PUB. L.
BLOG (May 13, 2020) https://auspublaw.org/2020/05/an-executive-grab-for-power-duringcovid-19/.
120 Kim Moloney & Susan Moloney, supra note 13, at 672.
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the Prime Minister declared that the National Cabinet will be replacing the
Council of Australia Governments (COAG) that was to this point the primary
coordination body between the federal and State governments. 121 In addition,
the National Cabinet agreed on forming a National Federation Reform Council
(NFRC). While the NFRC was intended to streamline the national and State
responses to the pandemic, what emerged from this coordination was an
understanding that no one-size-fits-all, and an every-State-for-itself approach
continued to be the policy cornerstone in 2020, just like it did in 1918. Hence,
Western Australia declared a state of emergency under its Emergency
Management Act 2005. 122 This Declaration was followed by Directions under
the same Act purporting to close Western Australian borders to all persons
“unless the person is an exempt traveler”. 123 Under direction 27, an exempt
traveler is someone who falls into a number of enumerated categories, including
senior government official, active military personnel, and members of the
Commonwealth Parliament.
The constitutional issue in relation to the Directions of Western Australia is
their validity as a restriction on the interstate mobility right found in the
Australian Constitution. The main argument relates to section 92 of the
Constitution, in particular the interstate intercourse guarantee. 124 Arguments
based on another section that protects a similar right, section 117, were not
pursued in the Hight Court.125
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

This part sets up the analytical framework for ascertaining this constitutionality,
and elucidates the common structure underlying both frameworks as a rendition
of the common law doctrine of justificatory necessity.
A. Strict Scrutiny
Given that the right to interstate travel is a fundamental right, as I have argued
in Part II, the Supreme Court will apply strict scrutiny to ascertain the
121Press

Release, Prime Minister of Australia, Update Following National Cabinet Meeting
(May 29, 2020); Press Release, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, COAG
becomes National Cabinet (June 2, 2020).
122 Western Australian Minister for Emergency Services, Declaration of State of Emergency
(Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/202008/Declaration%20of%20State%20of%20Emergency.pdf. The Declaration was made under s
56 of the Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA).
123 Commissioner of Police and State Emergency Coordinator, Quarantine (Closing the
Border) Directions, direction 4 (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/202004/Quarantine%20%28Closing%20the%20Border%29%20Directions_0.pdf.
124 Australian Constitution s 92.
125 See JOHN QUICK & ROBERT GARRAN, supra note 113, at 1163 (arguing that section 117 is
based on Article IV, § 2, and the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution; see
also, Stone, supra note 47, at 461 (discussing the influence of the U.S. Constitution on the
design and interpretation of the Australian Constitution). See generally, Benjamen Gussen, On
the Hardingian renovation of legal transplants, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS IN EAST ASIA AND
OCEANIA 84 (Vito Breda ed. 2019).
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constitutionality of hard state border closures. 126 The term “strict scrutiny” can
be traced back to the 1800s, in the context of equity cases. Provided there was
even a slight evidence that a debtor attempted to transfer his property to another
family member to defeat the claim of creditors, the courts. 127 However, as a
standard for judicial review, strict scrutiny made its first appearance only in the
late 1930s when the Supreme Court hinted to this standard without using the
term “strict scrutiny.” In United States v. Carolene Products,128 the Carolene
Products Company shipped interstate a compound in imitation of condensed
milk. The Supreme Court upheld a federal law129 banning such interstate
transport of compounds that resemble milk. In obiter, the Court stated that
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.... Nor need we enquire ... whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.130
The use of the term “strict scrutiny” as a judicial review standard had to wait
forwas not expressed until the Supreme Court judgment in Skinner v.
Oklahoma.131 The State of Oklahoma had passed a statute that allowed for
compulsory sterilization of habitual criminals as part of sentencing. Jack
Skinner argued that his compulsory sterilization sentence was unconstitutional
as it violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Skinner’s appeal to
the Supreme Court was successful. In finding that the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court explained the
rationale for strict liability in the following terms:
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching
and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races
or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the law
touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his
irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty. We
mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power
126

Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 303
(1997).
127 See, e.g., Booher v. Worrill, 57 Ga. 235, 238 (1876) (“Contracts between [relatives] which
retain in the family property that would otherwise go to satisfy honest creditors are to be
subjected to strict scrutiny—a vigilant judicial police.”); see also, Winkler, supra note 49, at
798 n. 10.
128 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
129The ‘Filled Milk Act’ of Congress of Mar. 4, 1923, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63..
130 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
131 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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of the States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that
strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a
sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in
violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws. 132
In order to pass strict scrutiny, the impugned law must “further a compelling
state interest,”133 and must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest:
If strict scrutiny is but one of the approaches that give enhanced
protection to constitutional rights, the compelling state interest
standard is just one part of strict scrutiny analysis. Strict scrutiny
varies from ordinary scrutiny by imposing three hurdles on the
government. It shifts the burden of proof to the government; requires
the government to pursue a “compelling state interest;” and demands
that the regulation promoting the compelling interest be “narrowly
tailored”.134
Moreover, strict scrutiny is context dependent. In Grutter v. Bollinger,135 the
Supreme Court emphasized that strict scrutiny is “context matters.”136 In the
context of preventing the infecting of State citizens with COVID-19, “strict
scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and sincerity of the reasons advanced by the [State]” for hard border
closures.137
There is no agreement on the overlap between proportionality and the tiered
review. The former is used to ascertain the constitutionality of restrictions on
interstate mobility in Australia. The latter is the analytical framework in the
United States. Richard Fallon has argued that strict scrutiny can be understood
as “mandating a proportionality inquiry”, 138 while Alec Stone Sweet and Jud
Mathews have argued that proportionality is “an analytical procedure akin to
‘strict scrutiny’ in the United States”. 139 On the other hand, Vicki Jackson has
132

Id.

133See

Miller v. Reed 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court has
recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel”); see also Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego 678
F.Supp.2d 1046, 1060 (S.D.Cal. 2010) (citing Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904–05 n.4 (1986)).
134 See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict
Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 359-60 (2006); see also Reno v. Flores 507 U.S. 292,
301-02 (1993) (“‘[D]ue process of law’ to include a substantive component, which forbids the
government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”
(emphasis omitted)).
135 539 U.S. 306 (2002).
136 Id. at 327.
137 Id.
138 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2006).
(setting forth his analysis and views of different Justices).
139 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008).
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argued that “the United States [tiered approach] is often viewed as an outlier in
[an] embrace [by many countries] of proportionality in constitutional law”. 140
Similarly, Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat have argued that differences
between proportionality and balancing outweigh similarities in terms of
historical origins and analytical emphasis. 141 Proportionality emerged from
German administrative, where emphasis is on limiting a small set of protected
rights, while strict liability emerged from German private law, with emphasis
on protecting an expansive set of individual rights. Notwithstanding, when
recalling that proportionality has three subsets, namely, necessity, minimal
impairment (suitability) and proportionality in the strict sense (stricto sensu).
The overlap between balancing and proportionality can be formulated through
economic effectiveness and efficiency. 142 The first two subsets (necessity and
suitability) involve a comparison between means and ends. In particular,
necessity is a form of effectiveness review, that compares to the rational basis
(first tier) test. The second subset that relates to less-restrictive means, is a form
of economic efficiency, in particular Pareto efficiency, where everyone can be
made better off, without making any one worse off.143 The second subset of
proportionality is therefore analogous to intermediate scrutiny under the lessrestrictive-alternative principle. The last subset, proportionality stricto sensu,
compares the end to the infringed right, 144 which lends itself to establishing an
appropriate relationship between the end and the right, or what is a balancing
between the end and the limits imposed on the scope of the right. 145 Therefore,
Proportionality stricto sensu ensures that the marginal benefit created by the
infringement on the right outweighs the marginal cost from said infringement,
or what is referred to as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 146 With this understanding,
strict scrutiny can be understood as coinciding with the third subset of
proportionality. In particular, under the “weighted balancing” theory of strict
scrutiny, “the court weighs the costs of a law in terms of its impact on individual
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Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L. J. 3093,
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7 (2010)..
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rights against the law’s benefits to society as a whole”. 147 This approach is
salient relative to other strict scrutiny theories,148 given that the two-prong test
of compelling state interest and narrow tailoring were introduced as part of this
cost-benefit (balancing) approach. 149
Note, however, that the economic mapping of proportionality and tiered review
do not necessarily mean that courts are open to interpreting the latter as an
economic principle, at least not explicitly. When they do in the case of the
former, for example the European Court of Justice (ECJ), proportionality has a
clear normative distinction from balancing, including strict scrutiny. 150 The
latter being a concept usually treated in isolation of any efficiency
considerations.151
Jud Mathews and Alec Stone Sweet also find an overlap between
proportionality and the three-tiered approach, in particular, in relation to strict
scrutiny.152 First, the two frameworks share constitutive components in terms
of the comparative efficiency outlined above. Second, both are intended to limit
legislative power. Third, both approaches are designed to implement
constitutional values that prioritize preferred or fundamental rights. Fourth, both
require a form of balancing that accounts for marginal benefits and costs from
the impugned legislation and the protected right. The last point suggests that
there is indeed a space where structured proportionality analysis such as that
found in Australia could inform implementation of balancing under strict
scrutiny. The analysis therefore suggests that strict scrutiny will uphold hard
state border closures. Although a rejection of hard closures is likely to be more
pronounced under the purpose scrutiny refinement, 153 where the court looks for
inconsistencies with “the structure and purposes of the federal system
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established by the Constitution.”154 The purposive approach is a refinement on
the traditional strict scrutiny analysis in that it informs the analysis of
compelling government interests by permitting only particular, specific
interests.155 Under this approach, hard state border closures will be upheld as
constitutional only if their prophylactic purpose is consistent with the principles
underlying the right to interstate travel. 156 The later emanate directly from the
federal ideal, where freedom of interstate travel is synonymous with the very
essence of a political union.
As I argue below, the standard strict scrutiny analysis requires that state action
is necessary to further a compelling state interest, or that the state action is
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 157 However, such
scrutiny is not fatal to the possibility of hard state border closures.158 Strict
scrutiny is not a monolithic standard. 159 The Supreme Court will tweak the
applicable analysis to fit different types of fundamental rights. 160 Empirical
evidence suggests that the right to travel has the highest survival rate amongst
fundamental rights:
Laws infringing on the right to travel are relatively more likely to
withstand judicial review (40%). The laws challenged in the rightto-travel cases include juvenile curfew laws, which are upheld in 66
percent of applications; durational residency requirements for
welfare, which are invalidated in both observed instances; and
restrictions on the ability of certain people to use national lands or
other designated areas, which survive 33 percent of the time. 161
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In addition, the Supreme Court tweaks its application of strict scrutiny
depending on the level of government infringing on a fundamental right. 162
Hence, empirical evidence suggests that restrictions by State executive are the
least likely to survive strict scrutiny: “Federal actors, such as Congress, the
federal judiciary, and federal agencies are much more likely to have their laws
upheld than state and local governmental actors”. 163 The lower the government
level, the less likely it is to survive strict scrutiny. 164 Although, in the case of
fundamental rights, “judicial review here shows signs of turning the
federal/state hierarchy upside-down”.165
The rest of this article fleshes out the requirements for satisfying strict scrutiny’s
two-prong test as it applies to hard state border restrictions in response to
COVID-19. It does so through a comparison with the analysis under section 92,
and the doctrine of justificatory necessity.
B. Free Trade Approach
The full text of section 92 states that:
On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce,
and intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal
carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free.
But notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, goods imported
before the imposition of uniform duties of customs into any State, or
into any Colony which, whilst the goods remain therein, becomes a
State, shall, on thence passing into another State within two years
after the imposition of such duties, be liable to any duty chargeable
on the importation of such goods into the Commonwealth, less any
duty paid in respect of the goods on their importation.166
The section ensures that trade, commerce and intercourse among the States,
whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be “absolutely
free.” According to a number of authorities on the Australian Constitution, 167
162
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29

this section was drafted for political reasons, in particular, to convince New
South Wales to join the proposed federation: “In 1891, New South Wales was
the richest and second most populous of the States; she was the only free-trade
State, and she feared the spread of protectionism under federation.” 168 The
section was merely intended to ensure that interstate trade was not “restricted
or interfered with by taxes, charges or imports.” 169 Given that section 90 of the
Australian Constitution states that “On the imposition of uniform duties of
customs the power of the Parliament to impose duties of customs and of excise,
and to grant bounties on the production or export of goods, shall become
exclusive,”170 section 92 was to have only a “local and transient objective.” 171
Therefore, it is no surprise that section 92 is silent as to the type of burdens or
restrictions caught by the term “absolutely free.” Nevertheless, the rationale for
this section makes it clear that the term “absolutely free” does not mean that
trade, commerce and intercourse must be free from all laws. 172 The complexities
that later emerged in the HCA interpretation of section 92 (see infra)173 were
largely due to its sidelining of the original intention of the draftsmen. 174
Following the British approach, the HCA refused any use of legislative history
and travaux préparatoires to help elucidate said intention. 175
The rest of this section analyzes the legal tests for each of the guarantees under
section 92, namely, with emphasis on the test relating to interstate intercourse.
First, however, a look at the place of this section in the Australian Constitution
to set the stage for analyzing the scope of its guarantees.
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The placement of section 92 in the Australian Constitution suggests a very
limited protection, relating only to the imposition of taxes and other financial
charges.176 Section 92 appears in the Finance and Trade Chapter of the
Constitution (Chapter IV). The other provisions in this chapter, sections 81 to
105A relate to the consolidated revenue fund (sections 81 and 82),
appropriations (section 83), transfer of public service departments from the
States to the Commonwealth (sections 84 and 85), passing of collection and
control of customs and of excise to the Commonwealth (sections 86 to 90), State
aid to or bounty on mining and production or export of goods (section 91),
transitional provision on the duties of customs chargeable on goods imported
into a State (section 93), transfer of surplus revenue to the States (section 94),
transitional provision on the provision of duties of customs by the States
(section 95), financial assistance by the Commonwealth to the States (section
96), transitional provision on receipt of revenue and expenditure of money by
the States (section 97), power by Commonwealth to make laws with respect to
trade relating to navigation and shipping, and to railways the property of any
State (section 98); prohibition on the Commonwealth of giving preference to
any State in terms of regulation of trade and commerce (section 99), an
environmental law prohibiting the Commonwealth from limiting the right of
States to the reasonable use of waters (section 100), interstate commission for
the maintenance of the Constitution, including unreasonable or unjust
discrimination by and State (sections 101 to 104), and takeover of the
Commonwealth of State debts (sections 105 and 105A).
Notwithstanding, the scope of section 92 it has been enlarged by the High Court
to the point of creating analytical complexities that prompted one of the
founding fathers to contemplate a threat to an objective as fundamental as access
to courts:
The creation of a limitation where none was expressed … was likely
to produce a variety of propositions. And so it has. Sir Robert Garran
contemplated that a student of the first fifty years of case law on s.
92 might understandably “close his notebook, sell his law books, and
resolve to take up some easy study, like nuclear physics or higher
mathematics: LaNauze, “Absolutely Free”, p. 58 (quoting Garran,
Prosper the Commonwealth (1958), p. 415). Some thirty years on,
the student who is confronted with the heightened confusion arising
from the additional case law … would be even more encouraged to
despair of identifying the effect of the constitutional guarantee. 177
A historical dichotomy between narrow and wide interpretations crystalized
into two schools of thought on the scope of the guarantees in section 92. The
earliest school, inspired by the intention of the framers of the Constitution, 178
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favored a free trade approach,179 hence allowing for government restrictions on
interstate trade and intercourse that are merely incidental to non-discriminatory
schemes. The default position was to uphold state interference unless it
interfered directly with the trade and commerce, or interstate intercourse,
guaranteed in section 92. Under this approach that does not distinguish between
intrastate and interstate trade, 180 the purpose of section 92 is “to create a free
trade area throughout the Commonwealth and to deny the Commonwealth and
States alike a power to prevent or obstruct the free movement of people, goods
and communications across State boundaries.” 181 The prohibited discrimination
is discrimination that results in a protectionist effect. This free trade approach
is therefore part of a narrow interpretation, although wider than that suggested
by the position of s 92 in the Constitution. After WWII, a second school, based
on 19th century economic liberalism, came into prominence. This individual
rights school is part of a wide interpretation that ushered a suite of complexities,
as referred to above. The school, which was inspired by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, emphasized the freedom of the
individual and suggested that the section was interpreted as prohibiting any
interference with interstate trade and intercourse.182 This school recognized the
guarantees as individual rights, therefore preventing government from
implementing a variety of policy programs even if they were not directed at
regulating trade and commerce or intercourse. 183 However, to compensate for
enlarging the freedoms guaranteed by section 92, the Privy Council introduced
two reservations. The first was the proposition that interstate regulation is
compatible with the wide scope envisaged by this school. 184 The second
reservation, arguably the Achilles heel of this school, was based on remoteness:
an indirect or consequential impediment that was too remote did not violate
section 92.185 This distinction between direct and indirect impediments to the
guarantees proved to be too problematic to uphold. 186 Moreover, under what
came to be known as the criterion of operation formula, this school focused on
analyzing “the formal structure of an impugned law and ignored its real or
substantive effect.”187
By the early 1980s, the High Court could not agree on how to apply this
formula.188 The individual rights approach itself did not command the
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acceptance of the majority of the high court. 189 The individual rights school
became outmoded,190 partially because of the unconvincing distinction between
direct and indirect burdens on the guarantees, but also because of the difficulty
in applying the criterion of operation formula, as well as the inconsistency of its
wide scope with the plenary trade and commerce power under section 51(i)
(trade and commerce).
Instead, the High Court opted for a historical and purposive approach to
interpreting section 92—an interpretation that saw a resurrection of the first
school, the free trade school.191 Notwithstanding, even after Cole v Whitfield,192
the High Court has interpreted the section to include prohibition on any
protectionist action, even if more subtle than the imposition of taxes. Moreover,
the High Court has interpreted the intercourse guarantee to be a wide guarantee
of personal freedom of movement among the States. 193 The High Court stated
that “there is no reason in logic or common sense for insisting on a strict
correspondence between the freedom guaranteed to interstate trade and
commerce and that guaranteed to interstate intercourse”,194 adding that “some
forms of intercourse are so immune from legislative or executive interference
that, if a like immunity were accorded to trade and commerce, anarchy would
result.”195 Nevertheless, it would be legitimate to restrict movement “depending
on the form and circumstances of the intercourse involved.” 196 This
differentiation in the scope of the guarantees under section 92, however, does
not accord with the original intention from introducing this section, nor with its
placement in the Constitution. The High Court was rather compensating for the
lack of a bill of rights in Australia, by convoluting the context within which
section 92 was intended to operate. 197
Note, lastly, that there is a common denominator between the two schools.
Neither school bars imposing legislative or executive restrictions on section 92
guarantees. Both therefore envisage a boundary to the guarantees in section 92.
The first school finds this boundary where the discrimination brought about by
the impugned legislative or executive action is only incidental, or in relation to
the intercourse guarantee, where there is proportionality between the action and
the end it serves. The second school finds the boundary where the impediment
is too remote from the guarantees in section 92. Later in this part, I bring this
common denominator to bear on the definition of state police power.
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In summary, today the High Court follows a free trade approach to interpreting
section 92 that limits its guarantees where there is a necessary public interest. 198
This is the same standard for meeting the compelling interest requirement under
strict scrutiny (see above). The High Court, therefore, enlarges the analysis to
include the practical effect of the impugned state action, as well as the political
and economic factors that form the context for said action. In the words of the
HCA Chief Justice, Susan Kiefel,
Economic consequence has therefore found its place in Australia as
the critical consideration in the application of s 92. This may have
the consequence that the focus of debate shifts to the reasonable
necessity for legislation. 199
A legislative or administrative action by the Commonwealth, States or
Territories will not infringe the trade and commerce guaranteed in section 92 if
it does not have a discriminatory effect (in law or in fact). 200 If the law is
discriminatory, it still will not infringe section 92 if it does not serve a
protectionist purpose.
Where the action passes a proportionality test balancing state action against the
infringed guarantees to interstate intercourse, the action will also be
constitutionally valid.201 Section 92 guarantees a personal freedom ‘to pass to
and fro among the States without burden, hindrance or restriction’. 202 The
freedom of intercourse has been characterized as ‘a personal right in an
Australian’ that is not limited to commercial contexts.203 See above for an
analysis of the shift from this rights approach to one based on free trade.
The analytical framework for the interstate intercourse guarantee suggests that
prima facie, a legislative or administrative action that has the purpose of
interfering with interstate movement contravenes section 92.204 However, there
will be no contravention if its effect is merely incidental to the pursuit of some
other policy goal; and the impugned action does not go beyond what is
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reasonably required to achieve that goal.205 Controls in pursuit of legitimate
governmental interests will not infringe the second guarantee in section 92, 206
where: “(1) the action is the principal purpose of the law is not to impede
interstate intercourse, (2) the burden on interstate intercourse is appropriate and
adapted to fulfilment of the law’s principal purpose; and (3) any burden on
interstate intercourse is an incidental or necessary consequence of the law’s
operation”.207 The proportionality requirement in step two is established where
the burden is necessary to achieving the underlying interest. 208 Hence, in Cole
v Whitfield,209 the High Court held that Tasmanian controls on the possession
of undersized crayfish was necessary to conserve this natural resource, given
that local and interstate crayfish were indistinguishable. 210 The High Court also
upheld State legislation prohibiting advertising by barristers and solicitors of
legal services relating to personal injury as there was neither discriminatory nor
protectionist towards interstate trade and commerce. 211
As discussed below, the test for interstate intercourse can be reframed as a twostage test.212 The first stage is where state action impeding interstate movement
be justified (by showing a non-discriminatory purpose). This stage is analogous
to the compelling state interest under strict scrutiny. The second stage requires
a balancing analysis analogous to the least restrictive means test, where the
means adopted by the state must be reasonably necessary for achieving the
object of the restriction.
C. Structural Primogenitor: Justificatory Necessity
In this section I explain how the interstate intercourse analytical framework in
section 92 coincides with the least restrictive means test under strict scrutiny in
that both are based on the doctrine of necessity. The doctrine has had influence
on the legitimacy of state actions under constitutional constraints, 213 and
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acknowledged under public international law as codified in Article 25 of the
International Law Commission’s (ILC’s) Articles on State Responsibility. 214
One can think of the requisite necessity under United States and Australian
jurisprudence as analogous to the common law doctrine of necessity as it applies
to criminal law—also known as the choice of evils doctrine.215 This section
fleshes out this thesis. The next section applies it to the High Court legal
challenge of Western Australia’s hard border closures. First, however, a
succinct summary of the common law doctrine of necessity as it applies in
criminal law.
The choice of evils (justificatory necessity) defense, which has existed since the
sixteenth century, is intended to prevent imminent danger.216 The development
of the modern doctrine of necessity “has been profoundly influenced by the
dominant political assumptions of the time,”217 an influence that is explicit in
the how economic liberalism motivate a free trade interpretation of the interstate
intercourse guarantee (see supra). Similar political influences can be discerned
in Supreme Court jurisprudence on strict scrutiny. 218 Economic influences are
also evident in necessitarian analysis. In the United States, necessity represents
an efficiency criterion that reflects a maximization of net social utility. 219 The
doctrine creates a hierarchy of interests, where collective interests dominate
individual rights because the former maximizes net social utility. 220 Under this
necessitarian approach, balancing analysis ensures that individual rights submit
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to the prevention of a greater evil. 221 Necessity is accordingly “an inherently
act-utilitarian principle for the advancement of a collective good.” 222 The same
understanding of necessity explains the shift we have seen in interpreting
section 92, from one based on individual rights, to one based on free trade, in
that the latter approach exhibits an economic rationale for the right to interstate
intercourse (see Part III B). The same act-utilitarian principle justifies state
action under the first requirement of strict scrutiny (arguing a compelling state
interest) and the second requirement (for least restrictive means) where there is
balancing between ends and alternative means. These requirements are a gloss
on the justificatory version of the defense of necessity, which is essentially a
lesser evil defense, where state action that violates the right of interstate
mobility is held to be constitutional given that it is the lesser evil option, that is
where “the rights violated are of a lesser order of importance by comparison
with the value being protected.”223 The State needs to show that it has acted in
a way which, while infringing on the right to interstate travel, is a proportionate
response to the harm which would otherwise occur. In the context of strict
scrutiny and section 92 jurisprudence on interstate intercourse, the doctrine can
be formulated as requiring four elements: 224 (1) the state action (hard border
closures) was committed to avoid a significant evil or harm (the treat to public
safety from the transmission of the COVID-19 virus); (2) the State reasonably
believed that its action was necessary to avoid this evil (suggesting the need for
epidemiological evidence in support of the necessity to prevent the transmission
of the virus, or at least to control its spread within the State); (3) the State had
no alternative legal means of preventing this harm; and (4) the evil sought to be
avoided is greater than the harm expected to result from infringing on the right
to interstate travel.
More relevant to the two-element formulation to strict scrutiny and section 92
interstate intercourse guarantee, is one of the earliest formulations of the
necessity justificatory defense. 225 As it applies to hard state border closures in
response to COVID-19, this formulation requires,226 first, that the state action
is necessary to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil, and second, that the state
action is no more than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved;
put differently, the infringement on interstate mobility must not be
disproportionate to the evil avoided by the hard border closures, namely, the
public health threat posed by the COVID-19 virus. Modern renditions of this
221
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two-element rendition of necessity include the common law defense in the
States of New South Wales and South Australia. Stated in terms of the
constitutionality of hard state border closures:227 (1) state action must have been
committed under “an urgent situation of imminent peril,” and (2) the State acted
with an intention to avoid a greater harm, and (3) there was open to the State no
alternative to avoid the greater harm. As a two-element doctrine of necessity,
the first and second elements combine to constitute a compelling state interest
analysis, while the third, forms a least restrictive means test. In the State of
Victoria, the doctrine is stated with direct reference to a state of emergency. 228
The section is similar to the reasonable necessity requirement under strict
scrutiny and section 92. The state action does not infringe the right to interstate
travel where the state reasonably believed that there is an emergency, its action
(the hard closure of borders) was the only reasonable way of dealing with the
emergency, and its conduct was a reasonable response to the emergency. The
frameworks above can also be reduced to two elements. For example, under the
Victoria provision, the first element corresponds to the compelling state interest
requirement (in response to “circumstances of sudden or extraordinary
emergency”), and state action is the least restrictive means to mitigate the risk
of death or serious injury (state action is “the only reasonable way to deal with
the emergency”).
This two-element formulation of the doctrine of necessity can therefore be
understood as a common structure to analyzing the constitutionality of hard
state border closures under both the U.S. and Australian Constitution. Part IV
illustrates how this analysis is likely to unfold in the Supreme Court, while using
Australian jurisprudence and the recent Clive Palmer challenge to Western
Australia’s border closures in Australia to motivate the conclusion that hard
state border closures are likely to be upheld in the United States as they were in
Australia.
IV.

THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY

The first hurdle requires arguing that the protection of state citizens against the
spread of a global pandemic, such as COVID-19, is the existence of an
emergency. In the following analysis, I show how this requirement coincides
227
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with the compelling state interest test under strict scrutiny. Later, a discussion
of the exercise of police power during a pandemic suggests that the introduction
of hard state borders in the United States is unlikely to fail on the compelling
state interest requirement. The states are not likely to have any legal issues
arising on this limb, as “No known case law that invalidates a public health law
as being unnecessary exists.”229
The threshold of a compelling interest appeared for the first time in 1957, in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.230 In this case, Paul Sweezy, a university academic,
was successful in appealing his contempt conviction for failing to answer
questions put to him by the then Hew Hampshire Attorney General as part of an
investigation into Sweezy’s connection to the Communist Party of the United
States. Although concurring with the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter, with
whom Justice John Marshall Harlan II joined, wrote a separate opinion to
delineate his balancing analysis, a reasoning substantially different form the
narrow basis adopted by the majority, namely, that the questioning went beyond
the resolution authorized by the subversive organizations law adopted by New
Hampshire in 1951.231 In describing this balancing analysis, Justice Frankfurter
stated that “For a citizen to be made to forego even a part of so basic a liberty
as his political autonomy, the subordinating interest of the State must be
compelling.”232
However, beyond its ordinary meaning of “tending to demand action,” 233 the
word “compelling” does not provide guidance as to the nature of the requisite
state interest. It can be interpreted as describing the social importance of the
state interest.234 This importance has been limited further to where the interest
is necessary rather than a matter of choice. 235 This refinement of the requisite
interest can be made concrete in the context of protecting public health, where
courts are likely “to construe necessity to mean ‘a highly desirable public health
interest,’ rather than applying the dictionary definition of necessary meaning
‘absolutely needed’.”236 We can therefore understand the phrase “compelling
state interest” in the context of state response to the spread of a pandemic to
illustrate the operation of the common law maxim salus populi suprema lex
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esto, which motivates the declaration of a state of emergency under state police
power to protect public health. Infra, I develop this analysis further through
examples from Supreme Court jurisprudence, with further illustrations from the
High Court of Australia.
Examples of cases where health care has been upheld as a compelling state
interest include Jacobson,237 and Compagnie Francaise.238 In Jacobson v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,239 a case challenging mandatory smallpox
vaccination, in a seven-to-two majority, the Supreme Court upheld the
impugned legislation, and affirmed that “under the pressure of great dangers,
[the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may] be subjected to such
restraints … as the safety of the general public may demand,” 240 adding that
constitutional validity rests on evincing a “real or substantial relation” to public
safety.241 The reasoning in the Court’s majority opinion, delivered by Justice
John Marshall Harlan II, used the principle of self-defense to balance the right
of the State to endanger the individual for the common good:
Applying these principles to the present case, it is to be observed that
the legislature of Massachusetts required the inhabitants of a city or
town to be vaccinated only when, in the opinion of the Board of
Health, that was necessary for the public health or the public safety.
The authority to determine for all what ought to be done in such an
emergency must have been lodged somewhere or in somebody, and
surely it was appropriate for the legislature to refer that question, in
the first instance, to a Board of Health, composed of persons residing
in the locality affected and appointed, presumably, because of their
fitness to determine such questions. To invest such a body with
authority over such matters was not an unusual nor an unreasonable
or arbitrary requirement. Upon the principle of self-defense, of
paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself
against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its
members. It is to be observed that, when the regulation in question
was adopted, smallpox, according to the recitals in the regulation
adopted by the Board of Health, was prevalent to some extent in the
city of Cambridge, and the disease was increasing.242
Jacobson, therefore, confirms our understanding of “compelling state interest”
as paramount necessity in the context of protecting the state against an epidemic
which threatens the safety of its citizens. The reference to “paramount”
necessity suggests that the compelling interest relates to a specific type of
necessity, not the absolute type, but as I explain below, one interpreted as
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emanating from the salus populi maxim.243 In 2020, the Jacobson test was
applied in In re Abbott I,244 where the Fifth Circuit dissolved a stay on a
restraining order barring enforcement of a Texas executive order as applied to
non-emergency and medication abortions, stating that “when faced with a
society-threatening epidemic, a state may implement emergency measures that
curtail constitutional rights so long as the measures have at least some ‘real or
substantial relation’ to the public health crisis and are not ‘beyond all question,
a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law’”. 245 This
decision shows, instead, is that the first hurdle of a compelling state interest is
likely to be met in the context of responding to the risk of community
transmission of COVID-19.
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https://www.astho.org/generickey/GenericKeyDetails.aspx?contentid=22924&folderid=5156
&catid=7203. Alternatively, where the Jacobson test is interpreted as a differentiated
standard, it is likely to be subjected to focused scrutiny. See Scott Burris, Rationality Review
and the Politics of Public Health, VILL. L. REV. 933 (1989). Focused scrutiny is a refinement
of the rational basis test that requires a focus on rational medical basis for public health
restrictions; Id. at 978-79. This type of scrutiny can “offset the risk of judicial rubberstamping, to defend against public health policy driven by fear or politics, and to strengthen
the scientific basis of public health measures taken during the pandemic”; Robert Gatter,
Reviving Focused Scrutiny in the Constitutional Review of Public Health Measures 16-17
(Saint Louis School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2020-32, 2020). The
main difficulty with focused scrutiny is that it envisages “an assessment of the best available
scientific information about a disease”; Id. at 11, which during the critical early stages of State
response, does not go beyond what can be ascertained under the precautionary approach. In
other words, paucity of scientific information is the salient characteristic under which State
interventions, such as hard state border closures, are to be reviewed. An explicit inquiry into
the effectiveness of such interventions will not be formed on rational basis under such
informational asymmetries. This point should not be confused with legal epidemiology that
can inform State interventions in preventing the spread of future pandemics. See generally,
SCOTT BURRIS, MICAH L. BERMAN, MATTHEW PENN & TARA RAMANATHAN HOLIDAY, THE
NEW PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: A TRANSDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO PRACTICE AND ADVOCACY
(2018). This epidemiology allows for empirical study of the effectiveness of interventions
only ex post. At the time that a legal challenge is mounted against any given State
intervention, such information is not likely to be available.
244 954 F. 3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020).
245 Id. at 774.
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Similarly, in Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board
of Health,246 State quarantine laws were upheld by the Supreme Court as a
reasonable exercise of the police power. In this case, quarantine laws issued by
the Louisiana Board of Health banned entry of people into New Orleans. The
owners of a ship transporting Sicilian immigrants into the U.S. filed for a
restraining order under the Fourteenth Amendment enjoining the Board from
enforcing the quarantine. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
quarantine under the Public Health Service Act of 1799:247
The act of 1799 … clearly recognizes the quarantine laws of the
states … And this very clearly has relation to laws created after the
passage of that statute [requiring] that ‘there shall be no interference
in any manner with any quarantine laws or regulations as they now
exist or may hereafter be adopted under state laws,’ showing very
clearly the intention of Congress to adopt these laws or to recognize
the power of the states to pass them … But, aside from this,
quarantine laws belong to that class of state legislation which,
whether passed with intent to regulate commerce or not, must be
admitted to have that effect, and which are valid until displaced or
contravened by some legislation of Congress.248
Deference to state protection of public health was therefore the first enunciation
of the compelling interest doctrine. This in turn invites a closer analysis of the
nature of this state power, and how it is likely to be exercised in the context of
preventing the spread of pandemics, a task that I return to after tracing the
origins of the first clear statement of the compelling interest doctrine.
The first clear statement on the compelling state interest doctrine came in
Sherbert v. Verner.249 Six justices of the Supreme Court applied this
requirement to invalidate a state law that incidentally burdened the religious
practice of observing the Sabbath. According to Justice Brennan,
We must next consider whether some compelling state interest ...
justified the substantial infringement of appellant’s First
Amendment right. It is basic that no showing of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this
highly sensitive constitutional area, “[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible
limitation”.250
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The 1905 “paramount” qualifier in Jacobson is acknowledged again in 1963, in
the first explicit reference to the phrase “compelling state interest.” In essence,
“paramount interest” and “paramount necessity” describe the same standard
under the first limb of strict scrutiny. Next, I explain this equivalence further by
tracing the origin of state police power, especially as it applied to the protection
of public health.
A. State Police Power
Very early in its history, the Supreme Court has declared a police power,
including quarantine and isolation powers, to belong to the States. For example,
in Gibbons v. Ogden,251 the Supreme Court struck down a law that gave
exclusive navigation rights to certain individuals for the waters of New York.
In its reasoning, the Court explained the local nature of laws protecting public
health in the following terms:
But so do all other laws regulating internal trade, or the right of
transit from one part to another of the same State; such as quarantine
laws, inspection laws, duties on auctions, licenses to sell goods, &c.
All these laws are acknowledged to be valid. They are passed, not
with a view or design to regulate commerce, but to promote some
great object of public interest, within the acknowledged scope of
State legislation: such as the public health, agriculture, revenue, or
the encouragement of some public improvement. Being passed for
these legitimate objects, they are valid as internal regulations,
though they may incidentally restrict or regulate foreign trade, or
that between the States.252
The “great object,” or paramount public interest in protecting public health is
therefore held to be within the scope of state police power. However, the success
of any legal challenge to hard state border closures depends on arguing that this
action goes beyond this scope. We therefore need to ascertain the outer limits
of power.
By way of definition:
The conservation of private rights is attained by the imposition of a
wholesome restraint upon their exercise, such a restraint as will
prevent the infliction of injury upon others in the enjoyment of [these
rights] … The power of the government to impose this restraint is
called police power. 253
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The police power can also be defined by reference to the functions of modern
government. For example, in National Federation of Independent Business v
Sebelius, 254 the Supreme Court stated that:
The States thus can and do perform many of the vital functions of
modern government—punishing street crime, running public
schools, and zoning property for development, to name but a few—
even though the Constitution’s text does not authorize any
government to do so. Our cases refer to this general power of
governing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal
Government, as the “police power.”255
These definitions suggest that the state police power extends to a complete
suspension of individual rights in the interest of preventing harm to the public.
The power envisages an occultation of individual rights to help protect a wider
public good, in particular, public health. The scope therefore gives the qualifier
“paramount” its full meaning, as “superior to all others” or “supreme.” 256
It is judicial review that defines the scope of the police power. The federal
compact, the vertical division of legislative powers between the federal and
State governments under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments ensures that the
police power, one of the residual powers, is preserved to the States. 257
Notwithstanding, the Fourteenth Amendment258 imposes due process and equal
protection as outer limits on exercising this power. No longer is the police power
a plenary one.259 Given this federal compact, the review identifies a core area,
beyond which exercise of this power is an impermissible limitation on the
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individual rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution.260 It follows that while
during a pandemic, States have an authority to protect the public health of their
respective citizens, they are able to do so only if restrictions on fundamental
rights, such as interstate mobility, pass strict scrutiny. To inform the outer limits,
given the common law origins of the right to interstate mobility, we need to
trace the origin of the police power, back to English common law, and the
underlying maxims of law that gave rise to this power in Roman law. This
genealogy can then inform how judicial review within the context of a pandemic
defines this outer limit.261
The police power has its origin in English common law,262 in particularly, in the
application of the Roman law maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.263
Under this maxim, the validity of legislation infringing on an individual right
rests on preventing immediate harm to society. At the beginning of the 20th
century, sic utere was restated in terms of the doctrine of salus populi.264 A brief
genealogy of this doctrine can help understand how it fits with the compelling
state interest requirement under strict scrutiny.
Salus, the ancient Roman goddess of health, security and wellbeing, is
sometimes cited as the source of the civic virtues that cultivated the ideal of
putting the city before the particular interests of its citizens. 265 This Roman
goddess is usually associated with the Greek goddess Hygeia.266 The name of
the latter is etymologically connected with Ancient Greek ‘ὑγίεια’, health,267
what became ‘hygiene’, or the source of health. However, the name of the
Roman goddess seems to communicate a wider idea. 268 The Latin word ‘salus’
means security, includes health, but also protection from enemies more
generally.269 The root of the word ‘salus’ itself comes from the Indo-European
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root *solh2 or solidarity.270 Etymologically, salus populi is therefore equivalent
to the subordination of citizens’ particular interests to general interests. 271 The
same expectation can be described as “generalized reciprocity”, 272 where
subordination returns a benefit, not necessarily from direct personal
reciprocation, but from the community as a whole. 273
The earliest known legal rendition of salus populi was by Marcus Cicero,
writing between 51 and 46 BC. 274 He used the maxim ollis salus populi suprema
lex esto to conclude a paragraph in which he ruminates his design for a consular
constitution. As the verb “esto” is in the hortatory future imperative tense, the
phrase appears as an order to the magistrates: in order to face a danger to the
Republic, the magistrates must not answer to anyone. They must obtain full
powers, including military command: “in extreme circumstances … one of them
or a third party [must operate] like … one-person command.”275 Cicero intended
a suspension of the institutions of government, including constitutional limits
on government power, to the end of protecting the common good. 276
270
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Many salient jurists followed in Cicero’s footsteps.277 For example, Baruch
Spinoza, who interprets salus populi beyond health and safety, sees it as a law
for salvation.278 To enable this interpretation of salus populi, Spinoza severs the
divine prudence flowing from the Roman and Greek goddesses and replaces
them with civic salvation. This salvation comes from salus populi as a
metanorm that underlies the rationale for constitutional limits on states. Spinoza
is explicit in claiming that the doctrine is the most fundamental constitutional
law of any state.279 To put it differently, “neither man nor God has a free will,
[although] both are able to express their essences without being externally
compelled.” 280 It follows that the doctrine of salus populi underlies any
constitutive power by which man, through the political state, can express his
essence.
Our understanding of salus populi today comes from the late 17th century
version by John Locke, who declared that “Salus populi suprema lex is certainly
so just and fundamental a rule, that he who sincerely follows it cannot
dangerously err.”281 This endorsement of the doctrine should not fault Locke
for overlooking the dangers associated with the doctrine, specifically, the
potential of abuse of power. Locke was simply making the point that the will of
the people, as reflected in constitutional designs and the democratic ideal, is
based on a metanorm. Therefore, when the issue is one of (constitutional)
legitimacy, “The ultimate ground of legitimacy is not the will of the people, as
such, but the good of the people.” 282 Specifically, the Constitution is an
instrument towards this metanorm, and instrument towards the good of the
people, but not absolute of the good of the people. It follows that any legislative
or executive action that is of advantage to the people, an action that has a
rational connection to the public good, emanates from the metanorm, and
therefore, cannot be invalid for violating the Constitution. Notwithstanding,
while this Lockean conception of public good brought a broader discretion
under the doctrine, it also introduced a limitation on the use of the police power
where it infringes on individual rights. 283 This version of salus populi states that
277
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“fundamental rights … can only be interfered with ... by lawful regulations
necessary or proper for the mutual good of all.”284 Necessity, therefore
underpins the limits on salus populi, the exercise of the police power, and hence
the requisite nature of a compelling state interest. The doctrine has been enough
to define the scope of the policing power prior to protections under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 285 when a broad plenary power was still feasible. 286
But even then, there were outer limits on the power. For example, Ernst Freund
explains the inherent balancing under a broad power interpretation as follows:
Effective judicial limitations on the police power would be
impossible, if the legislature were the sole judge of the necessity of
the measures it enacted .... the maintenance of private rights under
the requirements of the public welfare is a question of
proportionateness of measures entirely. Liberty and property yield
to the police power, but not to the point of destruction .... The
question of reasonableness usually resolves itself into this: Is
regulation carried to the point where it becomes a prohibition,
destruction, or confiscation?287
Put differently, under a broad interpretation of the police power, the
reasonableness of the impugned action is irrelevant to judicial review. 288 Today,
however, under strict scrutiny, the review has to look at the net benefit form
invoking salus populi against the closure of state borders. There is a rational
analysis of the necessity of state action. 289
As I have argued above, the genealogy of the maxim is directly connected to
the health of citizens: “[i]n the midst of the coronavirus crisis, public health is
an objectification of the problem of the common good.”290 I argue further that
the essence of a salus populi action is prudence or caution in the protection of
this common good—analogous to the precautionary principle. When applied to
human actions, salus populi requires a form of sagacity that accommodates
erring on the side of caution. This prudential consideration provides guidance
284
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on the requisite constitutional restrictions on governmental actions. 291 This
proposition comes directly from what Cicero referred to as Prouidentia, Latin
for providence. For Cicero, “Salus is united and enshrined in” prudence,292
because it serves to “stimulate the knowledge of the common good.” 293 This
understanding is confirmed by the origin of salus populi, as Salus, the ancient
goddess of wellbeing (see supra). A pandemic invokes hope of divine
providence to protect the common good. Prudence, the essence of a salus populi
action, is explained by the extreme nature of the threat that attracts a salus
populi action. This threat justifies the judicious cautiousness inherent in a salus
populi action. The threat that will attract salus populi is one that requires the
utmost caution in protecting the common good. We can also explain this
prudence in an economic sense. In the extreme event of a pandemic, there is
lack of data to assist in identifying the optimal response to protect the common
good—the health and wellbeing of citizens. To ensure that the response will
indeed protect the common good, what is an effectiveness criterion, action has
to err on the side of caution. This informational asymmetry has to inform the
analysis of reasonable necessity or proportionality under the compelling state
response. The analysis has to take into account the asymmetries inherent in
extreme circumstances such as a global pandemic.
It is not surprising, given the constitutional constraints imposed on Salus Populi
through the U.S. Constitution, that States have shunned explicit statements of
the police power in their respective constitutions.294 Instead, the power is found
in state emergency legislation. An analogy between Canada and the United
States can help understand issues with the current U.S. approach:
Although the United States and Canada have had quite different
constitutional frameworks, their uses of emergency powers through
most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were very similar. In
the nineteenth century, national troops were used to put down local
rebellions in both countries, often at the request of local governors.
With World War I, however, both moved to a statute-based system
of regulating emergencies. In Canada, the War Powers Act provided
broad delegations of power from the parliament to the executive. In
the U.S., delegations were also broad, but accomplished through a
series of smaller statutes. These frameworks lasted until abuses of
emergency powers were exposed in both countries in the 1970s. And
there the parallel history ended. Canada adopted a comprehensive
constitutional revision that brought all emergency powers within
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constitutional understandings. The U.S., on the other hand,
continued its use of statutory patches to regulate the relationship
between the executive and legislature in times of crisis. As a result,
the reactions of the two countries to the events of 9/11 were quite
different. Canada responded with a moderate use of exceptional
powers, while the US plunged into more extreme uses of emergency
powers.295
The U.S. Constitution does not have a specific legislative power for
emergencies or disasters,296 save for the suspension of habeas corpus “when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”297 Instead, the
Constitution has an incidental power, under Article 8, to “make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof.” 298 The courts will recognize a
declaration of a state of emergency by the executive branch of federal and state
governments if backed by their respective legislatures.299 There are also some
implied powers that authorize presidential emergency rule, including the
president’s power as commander in chief of the armed forces. 300 This
constitutional design, with its separation of powers principle, envisages
assigning emergency powers through federal and state government legislation,
a form of the accommodation view discussed infra. The effectiveness of this
model, however, is limited to external emergencies, such as the COVID-19
pandemic. In the case of internal emergencies, such as a rebellion, the
willingness of legislatures to enact statutes that concede powers to the executive
might not be supported by their respective constituencies. 301
The legal issue on determining what constitutes an external emergency. An
emergency is defined as a crisis of uncertain duration, but of such magnitude
that, if not contained, will pose a threat not only to public safety, but to the
stability, or even the existence, of a political state. 302 Sometimes, a distinction
is made between internal and external emergencies:
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[An] Emergency may be defined as a situation that produces a grave
disturbance of the political system or order, threatening its survival.
The emergency can have an exogenous or/and endogenous origin.
The most obvious case of an exogenous threat is a war or invasion:
the attempt by “enemies” to destroy, occupy, or somehow take
control over a country … More problematic are two other cases:
terrorism and civil war. By civil war we mean the attempt by internal
political actors to destroy the constitutional order (for instance, the
Kapp putsch at the beginning of the Weimar Republic; the OAS
during the Algerian war in France). Terrorism (internal terrorism,
such as that of the Italian Red Brigades or the German RAF or the
French Action Directe) seems to be part of the same family.
International terrorism may be somewhere between the two—war
and civil war.303
Pandemics are external emergencies.304 A pandemic is defined as a disease
spreading rapidly on a worldwide scale within a short period of time.305
Pandemics are therefore highly infectious and can cause a large number of
deaths in a short period of time. And although deaths per se are not a necessary
part of the definition of a pandemic, they can measure the level of threat that a
pandemic poses to public safety. For example, COVID-19 resulted in around
1.9 million deaths during the period from December 2019 to December 2020. 306
Governments therefore can use emergency powers to prevent the spread of
COVID-19. Hence, COVID-19 was declared a public health emergency on 31
January 2020,307 and a national emergency on 13 March.308 Similar
declarations, including disaster proclamations, 309 were made in every State. 310

itself is capable of covering a very wide range of situations and occurrences, including such
diverse events as wars, famines, earthquakes, floods, epidemics and the collapse of civil
government”).
303 Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 301, at 231.
304 Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 301, at 219.
305 Pandemic, DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 179 (Miquel Porta ed., 2008).
306 Coronavirus Deaths, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 10, 2020), https://covid19.who.int/.
307 Elizabeth Cohen, Dakin Andone & Ben Tinker, U.S. government declares the novel
coronavirus a public health emergency and suspends entry for foreign nationals who visited
China, CNN (Jan. 31, 2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/31/health/us-coronavirusfriday/index.html.
308 Kevin Liptak, Trump declares national emergency—and denies responsibility for
coronavirus testing failures, CNN (March 13, 2020),
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/13/politics/donald-trump-emergency/index.html.
309 The disaster designation is reserved to emergencies that require the deployment of
extraordinary resources. Many State have declared the COVID-19 pandemic a disaster. See,
e.g., Gov. Greg Abbot, the declaration of a state of disaster in Texas due to COVID-19 (Mar.
13, 2020),
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/DISASTER_covid19_disaster_proclamation_IMAG
E_03-13-2020.pdf (explaining that “declaring a state of disaster will facilitate and expedite the
use and deployment of resources to enhance preparedness and response”).
310 See U.S. State and Local Government Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Wikipedia
(June 2020),
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In summary, since Cicero’s formulation, salus populi has exerted a strength
similar to that of acts of parliament, including in England, 311 and the United
States.312 The relevance of salus populi is informed by its genealogy and the
underlying origin of state police power. The declaration of a state of emergency
allows governments to implement policies that would normally infringe on
some individual rights, such as the right to interstate mobility. Infra, I explain
how salus populi informed the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the High
Court of Australia.

B. Salus Populi Jurisprudence
The doctrine of salus populi has been part of Supreme Court jurisprudence since
the early 1800s. Its place in tiered scrutiny, however, seems to have faded away
in favor of a direct balancing of state action against fundamental rights, without
an explicit analysis of the limits that such rights impose on a state action
motivated by salus populi. Further insights of how this doctrine qualifies state
interest as compelling comes from the High Court of Australia, and related
appeals to the Privy Council.

1. Supreme Court Cases
The earliest mention of salus populi came in 1847, in Thurlow v.
Massachusetts,313 three different proceedings on appeal from three different
States (Massachusetts, Rhodes Island, and New Hampshire) that were argued
together before the Supreme Court. The cases related to several importers of
foreign liquor who had been convicted for selling foreign liquor without a State
license, although they have had authorization from Congress to import liquor.
The importers challenged the liquor licensing system in each state, arguing that
the license requirement was unconstitutional given that they already have an
authorization by Congress for liquor importation. The Supreme Court disagreed
and affirmed the judgments of the respective State courts, 314 finding that all
three State licensing restrictions were not inconsistent with the Constitution,
because “they are police regulations of the States, and derived from a right
reserved to make and execute such laws; and are not, therefore, regulations of
foreign commerce, though, for the purposes of protecting life, health, and
property, they necessarily deal with it”. 315 The Court’s pronouncements relating
to a State’s police power can be illustrated by the following quote:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._state_and_local_government_responses_to_the_COVID19_pandemic#cite_ref-32_and_counting_9-0.
311 Sperber, supra note 261, at 205.
312 STEFAN WEINSTOCK, DIVUS JULIUS (1971).
313 Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504 (1847).
314 Id. at 514, 573.
315 Id. at 527.
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It has been frequently decided by this court, ‘that the powers which
relate to merely municipal regulations, or what may more properly
be called internal police, are not surrendered by the States, or
restrained by the constitution of the United States; and that
consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a State is
complete, unqualified, and conclusive.’ Without attempting to
define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of this power, it may
safely be affirmed, that every law for the restraint and punishment
of crime, for the preservation of public peace, health, and morals,
must come within this category.
As subjects of legislation, they are from their very nature of primary
importance; they lie at the foundation of social existence; they are
for the protection of life and liberty, and necessarily compel all laws
on subjects of secondary importance, which relate only to property,
convenience, or luxury, to recede, when they come in conflict or
collision, ‘salus populi suprema lex.’ 316
Justice Catron went on to clarify the boundary of the police power in relation to
federal legislation as follows:
The assumption is that the police power was not touched by the
constitution, but left to the states, as the constitution found it. This
is admitted; and whenever a thing, from character or condition, is of
a description to be regulated by that power in the state, then the
regulation may be made by the state, and congress cannot interfere.
But this must always depend on facts subject to legal ascertainment,
so that the injured may have redress. And the fact must find its
support in this, whether the prohibited article belongs to, and is
subject to be regulated as part of, foreign commerce, or of commerce
among the states. If, from its nature, it does not belong to commerce,
or if its condition, from putrescence or other cause, is such, when it
is about to enter the state, that it no longer belongs to commerce, or,
in other words, is not a commercial article, then the state power may
exclude its introduction; and, as an incident to this power, a state
may use means to ascertain the fact. And here is the limit between
the sovereign power of the state and the federal power; that is to say,
that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of
the police power of the state, and that which does belong to
commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States.317
316

Id. at 631-32 (Justice Grier concurring with the judgments of the other justices, but for
different reasons. He formulated the issue in the three cases as whether “the States have a
right to prohibit the sale and consumption of an article of commerce which they believe to be
pernicious in its effects, and the cause of disease, pauperism, and crime.”). Id. at 631.
317 Id. at 599. See also, Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 297–
98 (1899) (“When Congress acts with reference to a matter confided to it by the Constitution,
then its statutes displace all conflicting local regulations touching that matter, although such
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to the General Government”).
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In Smith v. Turner,318 two cases with similar facts were decided by the Supreme
Court in one judgment. Both relate to state laws requiring foreign vessels to pay
fees to support the State quarantine system. The fees were based on the number
of steerage-class. Turner, the New York health commissioner, brought an action
against George Smith under the State’s maritime hospital law. The law allowed
for the recovery from every foreign vessel of fees that would then go to pay for
quarantining passengers when required. Smith, who was master of a British ship
that had arrived at New York City, refused to pay these fees. In the other case,
Norris, the master of a British vessel, brought an action against the City of
Boston to recover money he had been compelled to pay under Massachusetts
law for each passenger that had embarked without a bond. In both cases, the
master of the vessel argued that the power to impose such fees was exclusive to
Congress under Article 1, § 8. 319 Five out the nine justices of Supreme Court
agreed.320 The fees were in the nature of taxes that infringe on Congress’ power
to regulate commerce. The important point in the two cases, notwithstanding, is
that all nine justices recognized state police power, 321 although in this case they
found the power not to be relevant as the impugned law was about taxes, rather
than measures taken to respond to an emergency.
In Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen,322 a Missouri statute prohibited the entry
of cattle into the State between the first of March and the first of November of
each year. The Supreme Court found this statute to be in violation of the
Commerce Clause, because it was more than a quarantine regulation and
therefore not a legitimate exercise of the State police power. 323 The Court was
clear on the applicable standard defining the outer boundary of the police power:
While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary laws,
and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property within
its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering
under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, &c., from
entering the State; while for the purpose of self-protection it may
establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection laws, it may not
interfere with transportation into or through the State, beyond what
is absolutely necessary for its self-protection.324
We can already recognize the same absolute necessity standard that came later
on to guide the meaning of the phrase “compelling state interest” under strict
scrutiny.
318
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A similar interpretation of the policing power arose thirty years later, in Boston
Beer Co. v. State of Massachusetts,325 after the State of Massachusetts seized
liquor manufactured by the Boston Beer Co. The Superior Court rejected the
Boston Beer Co.’s argument that its charter, granted in 1828, gave it the right
to manufacture and sell liquor, and that Massachusetts’ prohibition laws were
void. The Supreme Court found that the charter was not absolute, and that the
impugned Act does not violate the Constitution, adding that the State may “in
the exercise of her police power, subject the company to the same restraints in
the use of its property as may be imposed upon natural persons”. 326 The Court
elaborated on the exercise of the police power:
If the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance
of any manufacture or traffic, the hand of the legislature cannot be
stayed from providing for its discontinuance, by any incidental
inconvenience which individuals or corporations may suffer. All
rights are held subject to the police power of the state. Whatever
differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of
the police power, and however difficult it may be to render a
satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does
extend to the protection of the lives, health, and property of the
citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public morals.
The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the power to
provide for these objects. They belong emphatically to that class of
objects which demand the application of the maxim, salus populi
suprema lex; and they are to be attained and provided for by such
appropriate means as the legislative discretion may devise… 327
The same understanding of state police power was endorsed in Butchers’ Union
Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co.,328 where the State of Louisiana incorporate
the Crescent City Live-stock Landing & Slaughter-house Company under the
1869 Act titled “An act to protect the health of the city of New Orleans.”329 The
Act gave the company an exclusive right to butcher live-stock within certain
areas of New Orleans. The plaintiff argued that this exclusive right was
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Miller, in delivering the
judgment of the Court elaborated on the State police power:
It cannot be permitted that, when the constitution of a state, the
fundamental law of the land, has imposed upon its legislature the
duty of guarding, by suitable laws, the health of its citizens,
especially in crowded cities, and the protection of their person and
325
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property by suppressing and preventing crime, that the power which
enables it to perform this duty can be sold, bargained away, under
any circumstances, as if it were a mere privilege which the legislator
could dispose of at his pleasure. This principle has been asserted and
repeated in this court in the last few years in no ambiguous terms.
The first time it seems to have been distinctly and clearly presented
was in the case of Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 646 … [The] principle
became the foundation of the decision in the case of Beer Co. v.
Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 28 ...330
A similar pronouncement on the state policing power came in Leisy et al. v.
Hardin,331 where the State of Iowa confiscated a quantity of beer manufactured
by the plaintiffs at their brewery in Peoria, Illinois. The plaintiffs, having
transported the beer from Peoria to Keokuk, Iowa, offered the same for sale at
a property occupied by their sales representative. Under Iowa laws, no
intoxicating liquors from any other state or territory of the United States can be
sold in Iowa without a certificate issued by the State. 332 The Supreme Court
reversed the finding of the Superior Court that these laws were in contravention
of Article 1 § 8 of the Constitution. 333 While the Court did not attempt to define
the police power,334 it pronounced that
it may safely be affirmed that every law for … for the preservation
of the public peace, health, and morals … lie at the foundation of
social existence; they … necessarily compel all laws on subjects of
secondary importance, which relate only to property, convenience,
or luxury, to recede, when they come in conflict or collision; salus
populi suprema lex … It is for this reason that quarantine laws,
which protect the public health, compel mere commercial
regulations to submit to their control … not from any power which
the states assume to regulate commerce or to interfere with the
regulations of congress, but because police laws for the preservation
of health, prevention of crime, and protection of the public welfare
must of necessity have full and free operation, according to the
exigency which requires their interference.335
In St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Mathews,336 buildings on Mathews’ land caught fire
from locomotive engines operating on an adjoining railway line. The legal issue
on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the State of Missouri statute
imposing liability on railroad corporations for damage to property resulting
from fire generated by its locomotive engines was inconsistent with the
Constitution. In finding the statute to be constitutional and a valid exercise of
330
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the state’s policing power,337 the Court cited with approval Justice Bradley’s
dicta in Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, for the salus populi doctrine.338
The same approach was adopted in Workman v. City of New York.339 In this
case, a fireboat responding to a call to extinguish fire at a warehouse situated on
the East River of New York City caused damages to Workman’s vessel, which
was moored in the vicinity of the warehouse. The City appealed the lower
courts’ decision awarding Workman damaged. The Supreme Court found for
the City, because “the principles affirmed and illustrated in the authorities
already cited forbid the maintenance of a private action against a municipal
corporation for injuries caused by the negligence of members of a fire
department, while engaged in the performance of their official duties.” 340 These
principles confirm the wide interpretation of state police power that we see in
the earlier cases:
The danger is so great and imminent that it is especially one of those
cases in which the public safety must be preferred to private
interests. Salus populi suprema lex. It is the public good, the general
welfare, that justifies the destruction of neighboring buildings to
prevent the spreading of a fire which as yet rages in one building
only. The duty of protecting, so far as may be, all property within
the state against destruction by fire, is a public and governmental
duty, which rests upon the government of the state; and it does not
cease to be a duty of that character because the state has delegated it
to, or permitted it to be performed by, a municipal corporation.
When intrusted [sic] by the legislature to a municipal corporation, a
political division of the state, it is not for the peculiar benefit of that
corporation or division, but for its benefit in common with the whole
public.341
The Boston Beer Co. approach continued in Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Miller.342 A
railway engineer died after the locomotive engine he was driving derailed. The
railroad was being operated by two companies through the States of Texas and
Louisiana. The accident was caused by the negligence of the two companies.
However, the Louisiana legislation incorporating the Louisiana company
contained a provision exempting the company from liability for the death of any
person in its service. This provision was repealed in 1884, before the accident,
and the question for the Supreme Court on appeal from the Fourth Supreme
Judicial District of the State of Texas was whether said provision have survived
such repeal given that it was part of the company’s charter. Put differently,
whether the State of Louisiana had the power to alter the contract between the
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company and the deceased. Citing Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,343 the
Court confirmed that “The doctrine that a corporate charter is a contract which
the Constitution of the United States protects against impairment by subsequent
state legislation is ever limited in the area of its operation by the equally wellsettled principle that a legislature can neither bargain away the police power nor
in any wise withdraw from its successors the power to take appropriate
measures to guard the safety, health, and morals of all who may be within their
jurisdiction.” The Court, therefore, affirmed the lower courts’ decision in favor
of the plaintiff.344
The boundary of the police power clarified further in Oregon-Washington R. &
Nav. Co. v. State of Washington.345 The proceedings originated from an action
by the State of Washington against the Oregon-Washington Railway &
Navigation Company, an interstate common carrier in the states of Idaho,
Oregon, and Washington. The State was concerned about the rapid spread of a
harmful insect that existed in the areas of the States of Utah, Idaho, Wyoming,
Oregon, and Nevada. The cost of a proper inspection to ascertain the presence
of the eggs of this insect was prohibitive, and the only practical method of
preventing its spread into uninfected districts was to prohibit the transportation
of hay from infected districts. On or about September 17, 1921, the Washington
director of agriculture declared a quarantine against all infected areas, and
forbade the importation into Washington of hay, except in sealed containers.
The Oregon-Washington Railway & Navigation Company, in violation of the
quarantine, shipped into Washington, in common box cars, and not in sealed
containers, approximately 100 cars of hay originating from the infected areas.
By a seven-to-two majority, the Supreme Court found the quarantine law to be
unconstitutional given that Congress has already covered the field, thereby
rendering this quarantine law illegal. 346
In the relation of the states to the regulation of interstate commerce
by Congress there are two fields. There is one in which the state
cannot interfere at all, even in the silence of Congress. In the other,
and this is the one in which the legitimate exercise of the state’s
police power brings it into contact with interstate commerce, so as
to affect that commerce, the state may exercise its police power until
Congress has by affirmative legislation occupied the field by
regulating interstate commerce and so necessarily has excluded state
action.347
343
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The next section illustrates the same necessitarian logic underlying the police
power in the jurisprudence of the High Court of Australia.
2. High Court Cases
The first High Court reference to salus populi as part of the common law of
Australia,348 came in Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Co Ltd v Commonwealth
(No 2),349 where the plaintiff alleged that the Commonwealth has infringed his
wireless telegraphy patent by using an apparatus based on the same technology.
The Crown opposed inspection of the apparatus by the plaintiff on the ground
that such inspection would reveal Commonwealth secrets that could be
determinantal to public welfare. Chief Justice Griffith and Justice Barton
allowed the inspection, arguing that doing so would not risk the disclosure of
any secret. Justice Isaacs dissentient opinion, 350 argued that under common law
certain classes of evidence are excluded because “however relevant that
evidence might be, its admission would, on the whole, do more harm to society
at large, or sometimes to third parties, than it would do good to the individual
litigants”. In support of this doctrine, his honor cites with approval Justice
Buller in The Governor and Company, the British Cast Plate Manufacturers, v.
Meredith,351 where
he gives some common law instances, in which the preservation and
defense of the kingdom are involved, and there he says individuals
may suffer certain damage and yet have no right of action against
the person who caused it. “This,” says the learned Judge, “is one of
those cases to which the maxim applies, salus populi suprema est
lex.” Of course, that is no warrant for extending the maxim to cases
beyond those recognized by law as governed by it. 352
However, it was only in James v Cowan—two decades later, that the overlap
between salus populi and section 92 was considered,353 and only on appeal to
the Privy Council.354 The case concerned the validity under section 92 of a
marketing system enforced by public control. The system, which had been
slow charity of a far-off and perhaps supine federal bureau. No such purpose should be
attributed to Congress, unless indicated beyond reasonable doubt.”).
348
On the proposition that there is only one common law in Australia. See Mabo v
Queensland (No 2) (1992)175 CLR 1, 15 (Mason CJ and McHugh J) (Austl.); Lange v
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563 (Brennan CJ, Dawson J,
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh , Gummow and Kirby JJ) (Austl.); Lipohar v The Queen (1979)
200 CLR 485 (Austl.).
349 Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Co Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1913) 16 CLR 178
(Austl.).
350Id. at 196.
351 The Governor and Company, the British Cast Plate Manufacturers, v. Meredith [1792] 4
TR 794, 797 (Buller J) (Austl.).
352 Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Co Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1913) 16 CLR 178, 204
(Isaacs J) (Austl.).
353 James v Cowan (1929) 43 CLR 386 (Austl.).
354 Id.; James v Cowan (1932)AC 558, 559; 47 CLR 386 (Privy Council) (Austl.).
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introduced in Victoria and South Australia, imposed quotas on the sale of dried
fruit within Australia, including in States other than South Australia, where the
plaintiff’s sheds were located. and compelled growers to sell the rest of their
produce in the less profitable overseas market. In a ratio of three-to-one (Justice
Isaacs dissenting), on appeal to the Full Court of the High Court, Chief Justice
Knox and Justice Gavan Duffy agreed with the earlier judgment delivered by
Justice Starke.355 Justice Rich also upheld the Act, arguing for “the principle
that legislation authorizing compulsory acquisition did not immediately or
directly affect inter-State trade but did so only consequentially. If this view is
right, it goes a long distance to decide the present case.”356 On the other hand,
Justice Isaacs found the paraphrasing to be fallacious,357 because “Sec. 92
cannot be limited, in its relation to commerce, to contracts for transportation.” 358
On appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Atkin, in obiter dictum, stated that
“legislation which has for its primary object such matters as defense against an
enemy, prevention of famine, disease and the like, is directed primarily to such
matters and does not infringe s 92 because incidentally interstate trade is
affected”.359 Lord Atkin’s statement explains how legislative action that has the
objective of defense against a disease will not be impermissible under the trade
and commerce guarantee in section 92. It seems, without more, that this
formulation coincides with that prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, namely
when the police power was still absolute. Probably, Lord Atkin’s formulation
is even broader; it does not contemplate any boundary on the scope of this
power.
While Lord Atkin’s statement referred only to legislation, executive action in
response to the same extreme circumstances is likely to be treated equally, as
confirmed by Chief Justice Griffith in R v Kidman.360 The case raised questions
about the applicability of a Commonwealth statute that makes any person who
conspires with any other person to defraud the Commonwealth guilty of an
indictable offence. The offence charged in the indictment was alleged to have
been committed before the commencement of the statute. Chief Justice Griffith
reasoned that the Commonwealth has power under s 51(xxxix) of the
355
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Constitution to legislate common law of the Commonwealth, such as the law
recognizing an offence to conspire to defraud the Commonwealth, and that such
a statute would be a law of procedure, and hence capable of retrospective
operation, at least as far as it refers to the fora in which the offence is to be
prosecuted. His honor also discussed other classes of statutes that are capable
of retrospective operation, including:
… laws validating retrospectively Acts of the Executive
Government which at the time when they were done were not
authorized by law, but were necessary under the rule Salus populi
suprema lex, would be within the [incidental] power. In both these
cases the authority rests upon necessity ...361
Similarly, in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth,362 the plaintiff
sued the Commonwealth in Admiralty for damages in consequence of a
collision which occurred between HMAS Adelaide and a motor vessel owned
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued negligence of the defendant’s officers and
servants. Justice Starke, in accepting that the Commonwealth has wide
prerogative powers to defend Australian when the necessity arises,363 cited Lord
Moulton in Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd:364
But such necessity would be in general an actual and immediate
necessity arising in face of the enemy and in circumstances when the
rule Salus populi suprema lex as clearly applicable. The necessity
would in almost all cases be local, and no-one could deny the right
of the Crown to raise fortifications on or otherwise occupy the land
of the subject in the face of the enemy, if it were necessary so to
do.365
Chief Justice Griffith and Justice Starke are referring to a special rendition of
necessity, one that should not be conflated with that under structured
proportionality, or the balancing exercise under the test for permissible limits
on intercourse. Jurists have formulated this necessity under the German concept
of übergesetzlicher Notstand (supra-legal emergency),366 or its common law
counterpart, what is referred to as the doctrine of overruling necessity. 367 Note,
however, that there are subtle differences between salus populi and these civil
and common law doctrines. Salus populi necessity is based on prudence, on a
361Id.
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precautionary principle, on erring on the side of caution, rather than on necessity
arising out of a calculus that attempts ranking alternative actions against
burdening constitutional guarantees. The necessity refers instead to lack of
certainty in combating an extreme emergency, that justifies occulting
constitutional limits on legislative and executive actions.
Perhaps the most significant High Court dicta on salus populi came in Victorian
Chamber of Manufactures v Commonwealth.368 The Victorian Chamber of
Manufactures, inter alia, brought an action against the Commonwealth, the
Minister for Labour and National Service and the members of the Women’s
Employment Board, alleging that provisions in the Women’s Employment Act
369 empowering the Board to make binding decisions on the plaintiffs were
invalid because they were outside Commonwealth powers under the
Constitution. In upholding the provisions, Justice Williams discussed salus
populi as follows:
The paramount consideration is that the Commonwealth is
undergoing the dangers of a world war, and that when a nation is in
peril, applying the maxim “salus populi suprema lex,” the Courts
must concede to the Parliament and to the Executive which it
controls a wide latitude to determine what legislation is required to
protect the safety of the realm. As Isaacs, J, said in Farey v
Burvett,370 “they alone have the information, the knowledge and the
experience, and also by the Constitution, the authority to judge of
the situation and lead the nation to the desired end.” 371
However, the role of salus populi in interpreting section 92 guarantees is more
complex than indicated by the above authorities. In James v. the
Commonwealth,372 the Privy Council, in a judgment delivered by Lord Wright,
cautioned that:
It is certainly difficult to read into the express words of sec. 92 an
implied limitation based on public policy … the question whether in
proper cases the maxim “salus populi est suprema lex” could be
taken to override sec. 92 is one of great complexity. Their Lordships
in this case will accordingly follow the example set by this Board in
James v. Cowan and treat the question as reserved until it arises, if
it ever does.373
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An opportunity to address this complexity arose in R v Connare; Ex parte
Wawn.374 John Connare laid an information against Victor Aubrey Wawn of
Sydney, alleging that Wawn was guilty of an offence under section 21 of the
Lotteries and Art Unions Act 375 in that Wawn offer in Sydney a ticket in a
foreign lottery conducted in Tasmania. A foreign lottery is defined in s 19 of
the Act to mean any lottery conducted outside New South Wales. The question
on appeal to the Hight Court was whether section 92 is infringed by the Act,
given that it prohibits the sale or offer for sale in New South Wales of tickets in
lotteries which are lawful in other States of the Commonwealth. Justice Herbert
Evatt looked at earlier decisions discussing salus populi, then stated the
following:
Undoubtedly the fact that by a particular legislative provision the
State is genuinely endeavoring to restrict the spread of disease, 376
although at the same time it is directly regulating certain aspects of
interstate commerce may in the circumstances tend to show that
freedom of the frontier is not being impaired. In such cases,
however, the reason is, not that provisions directed towards the
prevention of disease are an exception carved out of s 92, but that s
92, properly construed and properly applied, does not prohibit the
States from exercising a particular precautionary power having no
real relation to interstate trade. 377
We can, therefore, see two approaches to analyzing the effect of salus populi on
s 92. One that allows for an implied limitation based on public policy, as seen
in James v the Commonwealth. This approach fits into the free trade school (see
Part III B). The other approach, seen in Ex parte Wawn, eschews the
complexities of looking for such an exception, and instead, looks for
accommodating salus populi in the lack of a real relationship between the
legislative or executive action and interstate trade. This latter approach mirrored
the individual rights school, which at some point was in ascendancy, although
obsolete today (see Part III B).
The High Court had an opportunity to express its preference on these
approaches in Gratwick v Johnson, 378 a case analyzing the intercourse
guarantee under section 92. Dulcie Johnson was charged of contravening the
restrictions on interstate travel, an offence against the National Security Act.379
On or about 2 October 1944, Ms. Johnson, travelled by rail from Sydney to Perth
374
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to see her fiancé, without a permit under the Restriction of Interstate Passenger
Transport Order (‘the Restrictions Order’), which was made in pursuance of
the National Security (Land Transport) Regulations, which in turn were made
under the National Security Act. Ms. Johnson decided to travel even after she
has been informed that her reasons for travel did not warrant the granting of a
permit. In the High Court, counsel for Gratwick argued that the Restrictions
Order was a valid exercise of the defense power (section 51(vi)), and that
“[w]hen the country is at war, there must be power to control transport generally
on account of the possibility of its being urgently required for naval or military
purposes.”380 They elaborated that “in time of war … the word ‘free’ in s 92
must be given such a limited meaning as to enable society to protect itself
against an enemy and so preserve the organism of government and the
Constitution itself. If, in time of war, the court is satisfied that what is being
done is reasonably necessary for the purpose of prosecuting the war, there is not
in that case an infringement of s 92.” 381 Counsel for Ms. Johnson argued that
the Restrictions Order has no connection with the defense power. Rather, it was
a direct infringement on section 92 because it prohibited commercial transport
of passengers from one State to another. 382 Notwithstanding, the reasoning
seems to suggest that there can be extreme circumstances that invoke a policy
exception, stating that “There is nothing in the evidence … in this case to show
that a crisis has arisen entitling the Court to adopt the maxim salus populi
suprema lex in such a way as to ignore what would ordinarily be the
construction of the Constitution.”383
Chief Justice Latham was of the view that the Commonwealth has “very large
powers of controlling transport in time of war”,384 although said powers cannot
“exclude the application of s 92.” 385 In his honor’s opinion, the Restrictions
Order was a mere prohibition of interstate intercourse,386 and therefore “invalid
because it is inconsistent with s 92 of the Constitution.”387 As to salus populi,
he reasoned that
The maxim … [is] indistinguishable from silent leges inter arma. If
such a rule does find any place in the legal system of Australia, it
can apply only in times of the gravest crisis and emergency, when
the necessity of preserving the community and the lives of the people
takes precedence over all other considerations …388
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Unfortunately, this statement does not distinguish between the approaches in
James v the Commonwealth and Ex parte Wawn. It refers to the common
denominator between the two section 92 interpretation schools, namely the
boundary to the guarantees, but does not help explain the locus of this boundary.
Potentially, the use of the words “gravest crisis and emergency” is meant to
suggest a wide interpretation. Although I believe that the description simply
confirms that the boundary is reached in the event of an extreme emergency,
hence triggering a salus populi action. In terms of the first requirement under
strict scrutiny, the compelling state interest, the same necessity analysis
discussed earlier under the Supreme Court cases is also operational in Chief
Justice Latham’s reasoning.
As to Justice McTiernan, he dealt only briefly with salus populi, stating that
“Whatever be the legal content of the maxim … it is not the constitutional basis
of the present Order and the maxim cannot therefore invest the Order with the
force of a law superior to s 92 of the Constitution.”389 In contrast, Justices Rich,
Starke and Dixon seem to favor Wawn. Justice Rich was also of the view that
salus populi had no application on the facts in the case. Nonetheless, he added
that the maxim “was, in olden days, the basis of policies, but in these latter days
has not the same overriding effect, especially in the case of a Constitution where
the defense power is subject to s 92.” 390 Similar to Chief Justice Latham
opinion, his honor stated that “cases may occur where the exigencies of war
require the regulation of the transport of men and material.” 391 His honor,
therefore, seems to suggest salus populi does not create a policy limitation on
section 92. Instead, the effect of this maxim is to evince permissibility of the
legislative or executive action under wide section 92 guarantees.
However, Justice Starke seems to be dismissive of any role for salus populi,
stating that
legislation pointed directly at the passing of people to and fro among
the States also contravenes the provisions of s. 92. It is immaterial,
as I understand the cases, that the object or purpose of the legislation,
gathered from its provisions, is for the public safety or defense of
the Commonwealth or any other legislative purpose if it be pointed
directly at the right guaranteed and protected by the provisions of s.
92 of the Constitution.392
Contrast this view with that of Justice Dixon, who stated that
s 92 does not relate to the factual consequences which ensue from
the actual conduct of war … The consequences or incidents to which
the actual conduct of war in fact gives rise can scarcely be regarded
as any more within the protection of s 92 than if they flowed from
389
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enemy action. But these are considerations which have no relation
to a general administrative order expressly detracting from the
freedom guaranteed by s 92. 393
Notwithstanding the differing views expressed in the High Court, Gratwick was
an express rejection of the public policy limitation approach under the police
power. This outcome should not surprise the reader. Gratwick was decided in
1945, at a time the wide interpretation of s 92, under the obsolete individual
rights school, was gaining ascendency. Only three years later, the policy
limitation approach seems to have received new endorsement. In the Bank
Nationalisation case,394 a case that scrutinized the validity of a Commonwealth
Act that authorized the compulsory acquisition by the Commonwealth of shares
in all Australian private banks, the High Court found the Act to be invalid as it
did not provide for acquisition on just terms, as required under the section
51(xxxi) of the Constitution. This was an opportunity for Justices Rich and
Williams to restate the salus populi doctrine as follows: “in cases of grave
emergency the maxim salus populi est suprema lex can override s 92,”395
explaining that the Privy Council in James v The Commonwealth,396 treated this
principle as reserved until it arose, and that it was not upheld by the High Court
in Gratwick v Johnson.397 This application of the police power was endorsed on
appeal to the Privy Council. 398 It was held that section 92 did not prevent the
exclusion from passage across the frontier of State of creatures or things
calculated to injure citizens. 399 The Privy Council was already looking to
displace the individual rights school.
By 1951, the policy limitation approach seemed to make a strong comeback. In
the Australian Communist Party Dissolution Act case,400 Chief Justice Latham
was of the opinion that
If Parliament decides that there is an internal danger sufficiently
serious to justify legislation, in my opinion the Court has no
authority to overrule Parliament upon the ground that Parliament has
made a mistake as to “the facts”, or that, even if Parliament is right
as to the facts, the facts show no real danger to Australia. The
Government is responsible to Parliament and Parliament is
responsible to the people for such decisions. If Parliament disagrees
with the Government, or the people disagree with either the
Government or the Parliament, our system of government provides
393
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a political means of changing the policy. The courts have nothing
whatever to do with such decisions.401
The above quote seems, at first, to suggest an endorsement of a policy
limitation. However, the authority that Chief Justice Latham is discussing, was
limited to a mistake of fact as to whether an internal danger would justify
legislative intervention. Hence, Chief Justice Latham also stated that:
Ciceronian apophthegms as “Silent enim leges inter arma” and
“Salus populi suprema est lex” … represent not an application, but
a negation, of law. In my opinion the Constitution of the
Commonwealth has not been so imperfectly framed that, in what the
Government and Parliament consider a time of crisis when the
national existence is at stake, they can act promptly and effectively,
by means of executive action and legislation, only by breaking the
law.402
Chief Justice Latham’s statements seem to miss much of what great jurists have
said about salus populi and its place in the jurisprudence of England and the
United States.403 The relevance of this doctrine does not signal an imperfection
in the Commonwealth Constitution, but rather maturity in its interpretation.
Justice Dixon, on the other hand, seemed to continue his support to the policy
limitation approach, referring with approval to Justice Williams’s judgment in
Victorian Chamber of Manufactures (see supra).404 He also stated that
[W]hether regulations made under the war powers were within the
power to make laws … [has] uniformly been based upon the
principle that there is to be no inquiry into the actual effect the
regulation would have or be calculated to have in conducting to an
end likely to advance the, prosecution of the war and that it was at
least enough if it tended or might reasonably be thought conducive
or relevant to such an end.405
Although, it might also be that Justice Dixon is suggesting that the boundary of
the plenary defense power is capable of accommodating salus populi through
the expansion of its core, or under its implied incidental area, or even under the
incidental power in section 51(xxxix) of the Australian Constitution. To Justice
Dixon, such expansion of this purposive power, seems not to infringe the
guarantees under section 92.
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As to Justice Williams, he continued his support for the policy limitation
approach, stating that:
During hostilities there are many facts which in the public interest
cannot be disclosed, and it is necessary that the Parliament and the
Executive charged with the defense of the nation should be accorded
the widest possible latitude of discretion. In this period the Court
should, in my opinion, uphold the legislation if, in accordance with
the test laid down in Farey v. Burvett,406 per Isaacs J., “the measure
questioned may conceivably in such circumstances even
incidentally aid the effectuation of the power of defense”.407
Justice McTiernan also seemed to support the policy limitations approach, but
again, only where the emergency is an impeding war. He was of the opinion
that deciding on whether there is an emergency that would attract the operation
of salus populi should be through
[T]the guidance of a formal statement made by the Executive
Government of its appreciation of the international situation. The
Court would be bound to give very great weight to such a statement,
particularly if it positively said that there was an impending danger
of war. The existence of an emergency of that nature at the time this
Act was passed would contribute enormously to its validity … 408
Similarly, Justice Fullagar, even though he does not deal with the section 92
argument in the case, he seems to endorse the policy limitation approach as
follows:
The matter is in effect, taken in two stages. At the first stage, the
existence of war or national emergency is recognized as bringing
into play the secondary or extended aspect of the defense power.
This is done simply as a matter of judicial notice, and it provides the
justification for a presumption of validity which might not otherwise
exist in the case of an enactment which on its face bore no relation
to any constitutional power. At the second stage, the enactment in
question is examined with regard to its character as a step to assist
in dealing with the emergency, and the presumption is, so to speak,
reinforced by the respect which the court pays to the opinion or
judgment of the other organs of government, with whom the
responsibility for carrying on the war rests. 409
Only Justice Webb argued in favor of the real connection approach. However,
he did so in a direct reference to section 92, therefore, suggesting support for a
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wide interpretation of its guarantees. Note his reference to remoteness in the
following excerpt:
[Section 92] affords protection to industrial organizations and their
officials and employees; but it cannot prevent the operation of the
defense power or the incidental power under s. 51, for the same
reasons that it cannot prevent the operation of the Crimes Act. The
effect on inter-State trade, commerce or intercourse of laws made
under the defense power or the incidental power is remote. Such
laws do not regulate or prohibit inter-State trade, commerce or
intercourse contrary to s. 92. They are not laws about inter-State
movements or operations.410
After the Communist Party case, it took 55 years for a salus populi argument to
resurface in the High Court, and only in passing. In New South Wales v
Commonwealth,411 Kirby J referred to William J’s judgment in Victorian
Chamber of Manufacturers,412 citing with approval the salus populi doctrine:
‘[when] a nation is in peril, applying the maxim salus populi suprema lex, the
courts must concede to the Parliament and to the Executive which it controls a
wide latitude to determine what legislation is required to protect the safety of
the realm …”.413
In summary, while, as it relates to section 92, the salus populi policy limitation
has been rejected by the High Court, there is support for such limitation under
the defense power. One way of transferring the policy limitation in the defense
power cases to section 92 is to recognize that unlike state Parliaments, the
Commonwealth Parliament has no emergency power, except with respect to
naval and military defense. 414 Unlike the position in Canada, in Australia
residual powers reside with the States. We can extend the policy limitation
approach, under a narrow, free trade interpretation of section 92, by explaining
the power defense cases as applying to the Commonwealth emergency powers.
The same rationale would then apply to emergency powers that, under the
Australian Constitution, belong to the other level of government. The Palmer
challenge to hard state border closures as a response to COVID-19 provides
support for this proposition.
3. The Palmer Challenge
Western Australia declared a State of Emergency on 15 March 2020, under the
Western Australian Emergency Management Act.415 On 5 August 2020, under
410
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the same Act,416 the State of Emergency was extended until 12 am on 20 August
2020, and later until 3 September 2020.417 Concerns over these measures
attracted media coverage after Queensland mining tycoon Clive Palmer took the
government of Western Australia to the High Court over their 5 April 2020
Quarantine (Closing the Border) Directions,418 purported to be made under ss
56 and 67 of the Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA). Sections 56 and 67
state that:
56. Minister may make state of emergency declaration
(1) The Minister may, in writing, declare that a state of emergency
exists in the whole or in any area or areas of the State.
(2) The Minister must not make a declaration under this section
unless the Minister —
(a) has considered the advice of the State Emergency
Coordinator; and
(b) is satisfied that an emergency has occurred, is occurring or is
imminent; and
(c) is satisfied that extraordinary measures are required to
prevent or minimize —
(i) loss of life, prejudice to the safety, or harm to the health, of
persons or animals;
…
67. Powers concerning movement and evacuation
For the purpose of emergency management during an emergency
situation or state of emergency, a hazard management officer or
authorized officer may do all or any of the following —
(a) direct or, by direction, prohibit, the movement of persons,
animals and vehicles within, into, out of or around an emergency
area or any part of the emergency area;
…419
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Directions related to exempted travelers:
416
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Only certain exempt travelers can enter
Note: it is anticipated that an electronic pre-approval system will be
put in place to facilitate entry into Western Australia by exempt
travelers and to determine a request for any approval which a person
must have before they can enter Western Australia as an exempt
traveler. These directions are in effect irrespective of whether or not
that system is in place.
4. A person must not enter Western Australia unless the person is an
exempt traveler.
5. A person who is an exempt traveler must not enter Western
Australia if the person:
(a) has symptoms; or
(b) has received oral or written notice from a responsible officer that
the person is a close contact; or
(c) is awaiting a test result after having been tested; or
(d) has received a positive test and has not received a certificate from
a medical practitioner or a responsible officer certifying that the
person has recovered from COVID-19 within the meaning of the
COVID-19 Series of National Guidelines. 420
Under these directions, Clive Palmer was refused entry into Western
Australia.421 His counsel commenced proceedings in the High Court on 25 May
2020 for a declaration that the directions made by Christopher Dawson, the then
Western Australian State Emergency Coordinator and Commissioner of Police,

420

Western Australian Commissioner of Police and State Emergency Coordinator, Quarantine
(Closing the Border) Directions, paras 4 & 5 (Apr. 5, 2020),
https://www.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/202004/Quarantine%20%28Closing%20the%20Border%29%20Directions_0.pdf.
421 Clive Palmer, in an interview with a radio station in Perth (www.6pr.com.au) explained
the reason for the legal challenge as follows: ‘This whole challenge started because FIFO
workers contacted me, there was a high suicide rate among them, and some of them were
separated from their family for months and couldn't see them, and some of them came from
NT where there's zero cases, or less cases than WA, they came from the ACT where there's
also zero cases, and also Tasmania where there’s zero cases’. See Nathan Hondros, Federal
Court Finds “Low or Very Low” Risk to WA if Hard Border Dropped to Safe States,
WATODAY (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.watoday.com.au/national/western-australia/federalcourt-finds-low-or-very-low-risk-to-wa-if-hard-border-dropped-to-safe-states-20200825p55p8v.html.

71

prohibiting entry into the State by persons other than “exempted travelers”, 422
are invalid because they contravene s 92. 423
On 18 June 2020, the High Court remitted the matter to the Federal Court of
Australia, for a determination on “the claim by the defendants of the reasonable
need for and efficacy of the community isolation measures contained in the
Quarantine (Closing the Border) Directions … made on 5 April 2020.” 424 In
anticipation of the Federal Court judgment, Western Australia passed
legislation to prevent any potential liability, reported to be as high as $30 billion
dollars,425 from their quarantine directions.426 This legislative intervention
raised even more questions as to the constitutionality of Western Australia’s
border closures.427
The Hon Darryl Cameron Rangiah delivered the Federal Court judgment on 25
August 2020.428 The judgment makes extensive reference to expert opinions, as
well as comparative analysis between border closures and other methods of
transmission control.429 It even assesses the possibility of partial border closures
given the current community transmission rates in other State. Hence, in
rejecting Western Australia’s argument that “The easing [of the border closure]
can only occur without an increased risk of morbidity and mortality within the
422
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Western Australian community or population while there is no community
transmission within other Australian States and Territories,” 430 Justice Darryl
Rangiah suggested that such easing may be possible “without a significantly
increased risk of morbidity and mortality in the Western Australian population
while there is ongoing community transmission within other States and
Territories,”431 relying on expert evidence that “the disease can be considered
to be ‘eliminated’ when there has been no community transmission from an
unknown source for 28 days.”432 This statement was made even after the second
COVID-19 outbreak in New Zealand. On 11 August 2020, Prime Minister
Jacinda Ardern informed the public of “the country’s first case of community
transmission in 102 days.”433 Moreover, all cases “come from the same New
Zealand household and the source of the infection is unknown.”434
Western Australia argued that the objective of the Directions imposing hard
border closures are to protect “the population of Western Australia against the
risks of an emergency situation,” 435 by “limiting the numbers of people who
enter Western Australia in order to reduce the probability that people infected
with SARS-CoV-2 will enter.”436 They also argued that the closures did not
infringe the interstate intercourse guarantee under section 92 because they are
“reasonably necessary for, regulating or preserving the population of Western
Australia against the health risks of COVID-19,”437 and are “reasonably
appropriate and adapted to advance that purpose or object where there are no
other equally effective means available to achieve that purpose or object, but
which impose a lesser burden on interstate intercourse.” 438
However, analyzing the constitutionality of Western Australia’s directions
required an assessment of the risk of the COVID-19 virus spreading into the
Western Australian population. 439 Assessing this risk, which itself is “a function
of probability and impact,”440 required analyzing the following issues:
(a) whether there is ongoing community transmission of COVID-19
in Australia; (b) the public health consequences of persons infected
430
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with COVID-19 entering Western Australia and transmitting the
virus; (c) the extent of the contribution made by the border
restrictions to reducing the probability of community transmission
in Western Australia; (d) the probability of COVID-19 being
imported into Western Australia and community transmission
occurring, including uncontrolled and uncontrollable community
transmission, if the border restrictions were removed; (e) the
efficacy of measures other than the border restrictions in reducing
the risk of introduction of COVID-19 into, and transmission within,
Western Australia.441
The scientific facts required to answer the above issues were provided by five
experts on epidemiology and disaster management. 442 These experts agreed that
the risk of COVID-19 being imported into Western Australia depends largely
on community transmission numbers, that is, on cases where the source of the
infection is unknown.443 However, given that Australian States and Territories
“have strong surveillance/testing regimes,” 444 they agreed that “if there have
been no cases of community transmission (being where the source of the
infection is unknown) for 28 days in the state of origin then that is as low risk a
situation as can reasonably be hoped for.”445 Notwithstanding, there would still
be a high risk of uncontrolled transmission from the introduction of a single
COVID-19 case to Western Australia, as demonstrated in other Australian
States and other countries. 446 It follows that “border restrictions are important
to ensure higher transmission risk populations do not spread Covid-19 to lower
risk transmission populations.”447 The experts also agreed that while there are
other non-border measures that are useful in preventing the transmission of
COVID-19,448 “in many cases people do not follow [these] measures.” 449
Nevertheless, there was an inherent uncertainty about the transmission risk:
There are many uncertainties about whether the disease might enter,
the ways it might spread and the effectiveness of measures for the
control of its entry and spread. The issues, accordingly, involve
making predictions about what may happen in the future in
hypothetical scenarios. What is known is that in the worst-case
scenario, there may be catastrophic consequences for the population.
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These circumstances call for identification of principles that ought
to be applied when making decisions about measures to protect
against such risks to public health. 450
According to expert evidence, this uncertainty required adopting a
precautionary approach,451 and the Federal Court acknowledged that “the
precautionary principle is an accepted principle of management of a pandemic
which involves the potential for grave public health risks.”452 The principle
applies even where the probability of the health risk is small, but its
consequences are “potentially catastrophic.” 453 While the probability of the
health risk was found to be small in Western Australia, 454 based on the expert
evidence, the Court accepted that
If COVID-19 is introduced into the Western Australian population,
community transmission may be controlled or uncontrolled. Not all
cases of community transmission will become uncontrolled,
particularly as Australia has good systems of community controls
and tracing, as the experts agreed. The initial outbreaks from
February to April 2020 were brought under control in all States and
Territories, except perhaps Victoria. However, if left uncontrolled
for any substantial length of time, outbreaks will cause very severe
consequences for the health of the Western Australian population.
In the worst-case, the consequences could be catastrophic. 455
This conclusion established that a precautionary approach should be adopted in
Western Australia to reduce the risk of COVID-19 transmission into the State.
What was even more assuring was Justice Rangiah’s acknowledgment that
ascertaining the constitutionality of State border closures “involves making
predictions about what may happen in the future in hypothetical scenarios.” 456
He therefore accepted expert opinion emphasizing the “precautionary principle”
in combating the transmission of COVID-19.457 The relevance of this principle
is explained in the following terms:
[Given that] the probability of importation of COVID-19 into
Western Australia from a State where community transmission
cannot be known or quantified from reported data … such
uncertainty mandates the application of risk management principles
including the “precautionary principle” … traditional public health
interventions have generally focused on removing hazards that have
already been identified. In contrast, the precautionary principle
450
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states that action should be taken to prevent harm ‘even if some
cause and effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically’. The precautionary principle therefore seeks to shift
health and environmental policy from a strategy of ‘reaction’ to a
strategy of ‘precaution’. 458
However, Justice Rangiah’s interpretation of this principle, based on expert
opinion, led to risk management analysis, namely, that the risk of transmission
of COVID-19 into the population in Western Australia as the product of two
factors: (1) the probability of transmission, and (2) the consequences of
transmission.459 He elaborated on this risk analysis by explaining that even if
the probability factor is small,
if its consequences are potentially catastrophic, a precautionary
approach is required. This means, from a purely public health
perspective, all reasonable and effective measures to mitigate that
risk should ideally be put in place. This analysis, however, does not
take into account the legal, economic and social considerations that
must, in practice, be considered. 460
Note two critical points in this statement: first, the reference to an ideal solution.
Second, that this ideal relates only to a “public health perspective,” to the
exclusion of other perspectives. The argument, it seems, is that what should
happen, even without considering constitutional guarantees, is to balance these
perspectives, to get an optimal suite of measures to combat the pandemic. Put
differently, the precautionary principle is only an ideal.
A closer look at the risk analysis shows that on the first factor Justice Rangiah
found:
The border restrictions presently reduce the probability of COVID19 being imported into Western Australia to a very substantial
extent, broadly by somewhere in the region of 85%–90%. Screening
and PCR [Polymerase Chain Reaction] testing would not have the
same effectiveness in preventing importation of the virus. The
wearing of masks would not have any affect [sic] on the importation
of the virus, except to the extent it may reduce transmissions on
planes, but would assist to contain its spread I conclude that the
border restrictions are more effective than the combination of such
alternative measures would be. 461
On the other hand, his honor found that
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If the disease were introduced, transmission within the community
may be able to be controlled, as it was in some States and Territories,
or it may be uncontrolled for at least some period of time, as appears
to be the case in Victoria. By the time an outbreak is brought under
control, there may be substantial health consequences.462
The next issue after accepting the precautionary approach was to establish the
effectiveness of hard border closures as part of this precautionary approach in
reducing this risk.463 While the parties agreed that the border closure reduced
the number of people entering into Western Australia by around 90 percent, 464
they disagreed as to the effectiveness of this reduction. 465 The Court, after
reviewing all expert evidence, found that these closures were “accepted and
effective component of the public health response to the control of infectious
disease outbreaks,” 466 and that
the border restrictions are presently making a substantial
contribution to keeping Western Australia free of COVID-19. An
indication of the extent of that contribution is provided by
comparing the numbers of people entering Western Australia before
and after the restrictions.467

V.

ONLY REASONABLE WAY TO DEAL WITH THE EMERGENCY

This hurdle, the oldest element of strict scrutiny, 468 is an efficiency criterion that
compares the net benefit from alternative means. 469 I analyze it by elucidating
the interpretation of the least restrictive means test under the U.S. Constitution,
as well as under the Australian Constitution. The analysis reveals a common
design on which both Constitutions are based when it comes to the
constitutionality of infringements on interstate travel.
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A. The Least Restrictive Means Test
The courts have interpreted this requirement to mean that the restrictions on the
infringed fundamental right must be “the least restrictive means” to accomplish
the government’s goal.470 Hard state border closures are only one response that
can protect citizens from the spread of a pandemic. As discussed in Part I, the
response to COVID-19 included other measures, such as social distancing, nonsymptomatic testing, and even curfews and the closure of non-essential business
activities. The issue under this second limb of strict scrutiny is that the
protection
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when [that protection] can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. 471
In this sense, the test of least restrictive means requires that state restrictions on
fundamental rights must be narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s compelling
interest. However, the test goes further. It represents a higher level of scrutiny
compared to narrow tailoring.472 State action is narrowly tailored if it does no
more than eliminate the source of evil it sought to remedy. 473 On the other hand,
the least restrictive means test is an element of the overbreadth doctrine. 474 The
doctrine states that “government may not achieve its concededly valid purpose
by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching constitutionally protected
as well as unprotected activity.”475 This necessity formulation can also be seen
in the floor requirement for the least restrictive means test as found under
narrow tailoring: “Narrow tailoring requires that the law capture within its reach
no more activity (or less) than is necessary to advance those compelling
ends,”476 and government action will be upheld “only if ... it is necessary to
470
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achieve ... [the] compelling interest.” 477 While this necessity formulation
constructs a common thread, not only between this hurdle and the compelling
state interest requirement, but also interjurisdictionally, between the Supreme
Court analysis and that of the High Court of Australia, the necessity under the
second hurdle is different from that under the compelling interest hurdle, as I
discuss below.478
The requirement is that “the ‘government achieve[s] its compelling . . . interest
in the way that least restricts or burdens the fundamental rights’—essentially,
what amounts to a least restrictive alternative test.” 479 Adam Winkler explains
this requirement as follows:
To insure [sic] that government’s reasons are truly of sufficient
magnitude to warrant invasion of rights, the courts use narrow
tailoring to police against means that are overinclusive or
underinclusive. A law with poor fit—one that does not capture all
like threats—suggests that the government itself does not really
believe the underlying ends are so compelling. 480
The reference to over- and under- inclusive means emphasizes that the test
imposes a higher standard on state action, in the form of a balancing analysis:
balance no more than the state’s interest in the added effectiveness
of the chosen means against the individual interest and the use of
less drastic ones. ... [T]he Justices must estimate how much less
effective various alternatives means would be, how much more they
would cost-not merely in terms of the resources they would require,
but also in terms of their effects upon other non-first amendment
social values-and measure against accompanying gains these losses
to expression, association, and belief. 481
An early explanation of the least restrictive means approach was given by
Justice Frankfurter in Shelton v. Tucker,482 a case challenging the
constitutionality of an Arkansas statute that required disclosure by all publicschool educators of every organization that they have been affiliated with over
477
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a five-year period. Shelton refused to comply with this disclosure requirement.
As a result, his employment contract was not renewed. In a five-to-four
decision, the Supreme Court struck down the statute because the scope of the
disclosure went beyond what was required to ascertain the fitness and
competence of public educators. Justice Frankfurter stated that
Whenever the reasonableness and fairness of a measure are at issue
as they are in every case in which this Court must apply the standards
of reason and fairness, with the appropriate scope to be given those
concepts, in enforcing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a limitation upon state action -the availability or
unavailability of alternative methods of proceeding is germane ...
But the consideration of feasible alternative modes of regulation in
these cases did not imply that the Court might substitute its own
choice among alternatives for that of a state legislature, or that the
States were to be restricted to the “narrowest” workable means of
accomplishing an end .... Consideration of alternatives may focus
the precise exercise of state legislative authority which is tested in
this Court by the-standard of reasonableness, but it does not alter or
displace that standard. The issue remains whether, in the light of the
particular kind of restriction upon individual liberty which a
regulation entails, it is reasonable for a legislature to choose that
form of regulation rather than others less restrictive. To that
determination, the range of judgment easily open to a legislature in
considering the relative degrees of efficiency of alternative means in
achieving the end it seeks is pertinent.483
In the context of COVID-19, considering the efficiency of alternative means is
part of balancing the end of protecting citizens from the spread of a pandemic
to the means of a hard border closure. Such closures will pass the least
restrictive means test only if they optimize the net benefit between ends and
means.
The balancing approach can also be seen in Schneider v State of New Jersey.484
In this case, Clara Schneider and three others were convicted of distributing
handbills without a permit as required by the ordinances of four different
municipalities. The Supreme Court held all four ordinances invalid, noting that
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many opinions of this court [stress] the importance of preventing the
restriction of enjoyment of [fundamental rights and liberates]. In
every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights is
asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the
challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to
justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the
delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the
rights.485
The balancing approach adopted by the Court has to therefore go beyond the
formality of state action and looks at its legal effect. It is through this effect that
we can ascertain the requisite necessity in relation to the least restrictive means
test. This point was considered in American Communications Ass’n v. Douds,486
where the Supreme Court held that provision of the Labor Management
Relations Act,487 requiring for the recognition of a labor organization the filing
of affidavits by its officers that they do not belong to the Communist Party of
the United States, is constitutional. The Court stated that:
Although the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech, press or assembly, it has
long been established that those freedoms themselves are dependent
upon the power of constitutional government to survive … ‘the
necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless
speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and
imminent danger of some substantive evil which the state (or
Congress) constitutionally may seek to prevent.’ Mr. Justice
Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373,
47 S.Ct. 641, 647, 71 L.Ed. 1095. By this means they sought to
convey the philosophy that, under the First Amendment, the public
has a right to every man’s views and every man the right to speak
them. Government may cut him off only when his views are no
longer merely views but threaten, clearly and imminently, to ripen
into conduct against which the public has a right to protect itself. 488
The same interpretive philosophy can be extrapolated from freedom of speech
to interstate mobility. The requisite necessity inherent in the least restrictive
means test is therefore analogous to the paramount necessity under the
compelling state interest requirement (see Part V). In fact, the same
precautionary principle flows through from the compelling interest requirement
485
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to also inform the least restrictive means requirement, where the perception of
“a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil” is also an apt description
of the effect of a pandemic on the public health of citizens.
This idea of necessity became more explicit in Supreme Court jurisprudence by
the mid-1960s, concurrently with the formulation of strict scrutiny analysis. For
example, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers,489 where the State of Alabama
attempted to restrain the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (N.A.A.C.P.) from operating within Alabama, arguing that the
association failed to comply with statutory requirements imposed on foreign
associations for doing business in Alabama. In rejecting this argument, the
Supreme Court provided an explicit link between the least restrictive means test
and the balancing approach based on necessity:
This Court has repeatedly held that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.490
The application of this test in the area of free speech has been explained as
follows:
Under the least restrictive means test the court must first determine
whether the governmental purpose underlying the Statute is
“legitimate and substantial.” Assuming the state’s interest meets this
test, the court must then look to see if the statutory provisions are
narrowly tailored so as to be the least restrictive means of achieving
that legitimate goal. Just how narrowly tailored the statutory
provisions must be depends to some extent on how weighty the
government’s asserted interest proves to be. Although the Supreme
Court has assiduously eschewed the terminology of “balancing” in
this area, an inverse relationship appears implicit in the Court’s
approach toward the substantiality of the government’s interest on
the one hand, and the degree to which statutes impinging upon free
speech must be narrowly tailored on the other.491
The narrow tailoring requirement is hence understood as a least restrictive
means test, where alternative means have to be compared to state action using
an efficiency criterion. In the context of a response to a pandemic, the necessity
of the state action depends on its optimality; on being the most efficient
response to the threat of community infection. The necessity becomes apparent
when we think of this efficiency as analogous to the minimal impairment
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requirement under proportionality. 492 This necessity emerges where there is no
reasonable alternative for achieving the compelling state interest that is less
restrictive on the infringed right, 493 that is, when less-restrictive alternatives are
less effective in achieving the compelling state interest. 494 However, the
structured version of proportionality goes beyond the least restrictive means
element. It applies proportionality stricto sensu, where the state action
infringing on a fundamental right has to be “adequate in the balance”:
a criterion requiring a value judgment, consistently with the limits
of the judicial function, describing the balance between the
importance of the purpose served by the restrictive measure and the
extent of the restriction it imposes on the freedom. 495
In other words, “The more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more
important the objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”496 For example, where
a State closes its borders to all traffic to address the compelling interest in
reducing the spread of COVID-19, the State has to show that a less restrictive
means to addressing the spread of COVID-19 into the State does not exist. This
is a harder hurdle to clear in the context of prophylactic hard border closures,
given the existence of less restrictive means such as curfews, stay home rules,
and social distancing. However, Palmer v. Western Australia, suggests that
there is a high likelihood that the Supreme Court will uphold these restrictions.
B. Proportionality Analysis
The analysis of the mobility guarantee in section 92 requires a balancing
exercise where different alternatives to state action, in our case hard border
closures, are assessed for their ability to achieve the state objective with a lower
burden on the infringed right, the right to interstate travel. As I illustrate below,
sometimes this balancing analysis is framed in terms of reasonableness of state
action, more specifically, the analysis is framed as one of reasonable necessity.
An example of this approach can be found in AMS v. AIF (see below).497 Under
reasonable necessity, the focus is the same as when comparing alternatives: the
net benefit from each alternative, that is the benefit from an alternative over and
above the burden imposed by the alternative on the infringed right, is analyzed
to see if any of the alternatives has a higher net benefit than the impugned state
492
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action. If the net benefit from the state action is the largest, it is said to be the
reasonable action to achieve the state objective (protection of public health) in
response to the emergency (pandemic). Another approach, also found in AMS
v. AIF, tests whether state action is appropriate and adapted to achieve the state
objective. An example of a complete failure of the state action to be appropriate
and adapted to achieve an objective relating to public health and safety is
illustrated below in the case of R v Smithers; Ex parte Benson.498
1. High Court Cases
An example is where the High Court found impermissible restrictions on a
parent from moving interstate for the objective of protecting the welfare of the
child. In AMS v. AIF,499 a couple who met in Perth, Western Australia, had a
child after they have moved to the Northern Territory. After the couple
separated in 1994, they returned to live in Perth, and the child continued to live
with the mother. However, the following year, the mother wanted to go back to
the Northern Territory with the child, and the father obtained an order
restraining the mother from removing the child from Western Australia.
However, under the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act,500 intercourse
between the Northern Territory and the States shall be absolutely free. This was
an additional guarantee to interstate mobility, in addition to that under section
92 of the Australian Constitution. The mother argued that the restraining order
made by the Family Court of Western Australia was in contravention of this
guarantee.
In the High Court, all seven justices disagreed with the mother, finding that the
restraining order did not infringe neither the federal nor Northern Territory
guarantees. Chief Justice Gleeson, with whom Justices McHugh, Gummow and
Hayne concurred, adopted a balancing analysis which framed the legal issue as
follows: whether “the impediment was greater than that reasonably required to
achieve the [objective of protecting the child].”501 This reasonableness
requirement compares the actual impediment to alternatives to ensure that the
least restrictive means are adopted to protect the interests of the child. Justice
Gaudron applied instead a necessity analysis, but similarly close to the one seen
under the least restrictive means test. She focused on whether the impediment
was “appropriate and adapted to avert risk to the child’s well-being,”502 finding
that “A power to restrain a parent from moving interstate, if that is necessary to
avert a risk to the welfare of the child, may fairly be considered appropriate and
adapted to securing the child’s welfare.”503 Justice Kirby, adopting an approach
closer to the plurality, analyzed the issue as one based on proportionality, given
that the burden on interstate travel was only incidental to the welfare of the
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child.504 Justice Callinan seemed to combine these different analytical
approaches by stating that the restraining order was neither disproportionate nor
inappropriate,505 but reasonably necessary to secure or protect the welfare of the
child.506
Similarly, there is authority that a state action preventing entry of socially
undesirable persons will contravene s 92. In R v Smithers; Ex parte Benson,507
John Benson was convicted in the State of Victoria of the offence of having
insufficient lawful means of support and was sentenced to imprisonment for
twelve months. After his release, he immediately went to Sydney, in the State
of New South Wales, to search for employment. He was convicted under a New
South Wales law that required the lapse of three years before people convicted
of the same offence and receiving the same sentence as Benson can enter the
State. The High Court struck down this requirement as contravening the
interstate mobility guarantee under section 92, because Benson’s offence was
outside the state policing power as the offence did not one affecting public
safety.508 Justice Barton made a useful comparison:
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Crandall v. State of Nevada, 6 Wall., 35 as expressed by Miller J.
… is as cogent in relation to the Constitution of this Commonwealth,
as it was when applied to the Constitution of the United States. The
whole of that memorable judgment is instructive upon the rights of
the citizens of a federation. The reasoning shows that the creation of
a federal union with one government and one legislature in respect
of national affairs assures to every free citizen the right of access to
the institutions, and of due participation in the activities of the
nation. In my opinion, the reasons for the decision are conclusive as
to all parts of Australia. A great deal of that which it is usual to call
the “police power,” the “right of self-defense” in respect of such
matters as internal order, or the safety, health and morals of the
people of the State, is probably affected by this new right … It is
probable that the right of the citizen, so far as it may be described by
the word “intercourse,” is not carried much further by sec. 92 of the
Australian Constitution than the fact of union necessarily carried it,
though the express prohibition of that section against restriction no
doubt makes the Australian Charter much stronger than the
American in respect of trade and commerce … whatever may be the
residue of power left to the State in this regard, it is clearly limited
by the existence of some necessity for the defensive precaution. 509
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According to Justice Barton, the same necessity approach was therefore held to
be a common denominator on restriction on interstate mobility in the United
States and in Australia.
However, there is also authority that the Commonwealth cannot prohibit
interstate travel, even if the stated objective is to protect public safety. In
Gratwick v Johnson,510 Dulcie Johnson was charged under a national security
statute for traveling without a permit from the State of South Australia to the
State of Western Australia. The High Court found the statute to contravene the
interstate intercourse guarantee under section 92. The reasoning given by Chief
Justice Latham was stated as follows:
In the present case, the provision in the Order that no person shall
without a permit travel by rail from any State in the Commonwealth
to any other State therein is a mere prohibition of inter-State [sic]
intercourse. It is in terms “directed against” such intercourse …
[However,] There are no provisions in the Order which can be relied
upon for the purpose of preventing the Director-General of Land
Transport from exercising his powers in a completely arbitrary
manner.511
For Justice Rich, with whom Justice Dixon agreed,512 the legal issue turns
instead on whether there was a compelling state interest to require such
restrictions on interstate intercourse. 513
For Justice Starke, with whom Justice McTiernan agreed, the fact that the permit
system was a direct restriction on the interstate intercourse guarantee was
enough to make it contravene section 92. 514 A direct restriction requires that the
state objective is to impede interstate mobility. In the case of COVID-19 hard
state border closures, the objective is to impede the transmission of the virus
into the State, which is therefore an indirect interference with the mobility
guarantee.
Another example of the indirect restrictions is Cunliffe v Commonwealth.515 Ian
George Cunliffe and Ian John Nicol, both practitioners from the States of New
South Wales and Victoria respectively, sued the Commonwealth in the High
Court for a declaration that part of the Migration Act,516 was invalid because it
prohibited a person who was not registered under the Act from giving
immigration assistance unless he or she came within certain exceptions. In
upholding the impugned part of the Act, the High Court elaborated on the
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interstate intercourse test. A legislative or administrative action “may
incidentally restrict movement interstate, provided the means adopted to
achieve the purpose of the action are not inappropriate or disproportionate. 517
Further clarification of the indirect contravention criterion came in ALPA Ltd v
Legal Services Commissioner (NSW),518 the statute regulating the legal
profession in New South Wales prohibited practitioners from publishing an
advertisement that included any legal service relating to recovery of money in
respect of personal injury. The plaintiffs claimed that the statute infringed the
guarantees in section 92 because they impeded advertisements of the prohibited
class from other States, for example, through the internet. In the High Court,
Chief Justice Gleeson, and Justices Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon,
(Justices McHugh, Kirby not deciding) found that the statute did not
discriminate against interstate trade or commerce in a protectionist sense.
Hence, it did not contravene the first limb of s 92 of the Constitution. Moreover,
that, to the extent the prohibition extended to interstate communications which
were not in trade and commerce, but which were intercourse, the purpose of the
statute was not to impede interstate intercourse. The test was that any incidental
impediment was not greater than was reasonably required to achieve the
objective of the statute, namely, to restrict advertising legal services relating to
personal injury. Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Heydon summarized their
reasoning as follows:
Communication is intercourse, and covers advertising which is not
part of trade and commerce. Let it be assumed that at least some of
the advertising covered by the regulations is in that category. The
object of the regulations is not to impede interstate intercourse. The
test to be applied therefore is whether the impediment to such
intercourse imposed by the regulations is greater than is reasonably
required to achieve the object of the regulations. The object of the
regulations is to restrict the advertising of legal services to be
provided in New South Wales. That object can only be achieved by
a general restriction on the advertising of such services. The
impediment to interstate intercourse is no greater than is reasonably
required to achieve the object of the regulations. 519
The threshold of indirect or incidental interference is confirmed as the first step
in the analysis. Only where the contravention of the guarantee is incidental to
state action will the balancing analysis be relevant, namely, that the impediment
to interstate intercourse is not greater than what is reasonably required to
achieve the object of the legislation which is otherwise within the legislative
power.520 However, this distinction between direct and indirect, or incidental,
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restrictions on the right to interstate travel is unlikely to pause a hurdle to
upholding state action as it relates to hard border closures in response to a
pandemic. The analytical framework remains one of reasonable necessity of the
state action infringing on interstate intercourse.
ALPA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) also provides useful gloss on
the balancing analysis under the mobility guarantee in section 92. Justice
McHugh clarified that the validity of state action under this balancing analysis
has to take into consideration the social and practical implications of state
action, stating that “Validity is determined after examining ‘the nature and
quality of the restriction in the light of the known and proved economic social
and other circumstances of its imposition and of the community in which it is
imposed’.”521 Likewise, Justice Gummow applied the balancing analysis as a
reasonable necessity requirement on state action. 522 Arguably, the clearest
pronouncement on the intercourse limb of section 92 came from Justice Hayne.
After a detailed review of the authorities on interstate intercourse, his honor
provides a succinct statement of the test: “the impugned regulations work on
interstate intercourse is no greater than is necessary to achieve their purpose.”523
In summary, the above examples from High Court jurisprudence illustrates the
balancing analysis required by the interstate intercourse guarantee in section 92.
The examples confirm that this analysis is detailed as a reasonable necessity
criterion, which verifies that the doctrine of (justificatory) necessity underlies
second element of this constitutional analysis. The next section expands on this
point as it relates directly to COVID-19 and the constitutionality of hard state
border closures in response to this pandemic. 524
2. The Palmer Challenge
In the legal challenge to Western Australia’s border closures, the Australian
Federal Court had to also engage the proportionality analysis of identifying
alternative measures to hard border closures and their effectiveness relative to
these closures.525 The Court accepted expert opinion identifying two sets of
alternatives. There were alternative non-border measures, and alternative border
measures. Experts identified non-border measures, including, intrastate
movement restrictions, self-isolation, quarantine regimes, the mandatory use of
personal protective equipment (PPE), good hand hygiene practices, social
(physical) distancing requirements, restrictions on mass gatherings, surveillance
521
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and contact tracing, and community education on how to engage with these
measures.526 From these non-border measures the experts identified a
“Common Measures” set adopted by all States and Territories:
measures taken to isolate all cases, and quarantine all potential cases,
of COVID-19; measures taken (or that have been previously taken
and could be reimposed) to prevent or limit the movement of persons
geographically within a State (including stay-at-home directions,
maximum distance travel-from-home directions and regulations
preventing movement into and out of particular locations, including
remote communities); measures taken (or that have been previously
taken and could be reimposed) to limit the number of people that
may meet in a group; measures encouraging individuals to practice
social distancing; measures encouraging individuals to undertake
regular handwashing; measures facilitating contact tracing; and
measures taken to increase the testing of potential COVID-19
cases.527
The proportionality analysis requires first a clear formulation of the state
interest underlying hard border closures. This in turn requires identifying the
relevant risk arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. There was disagreement
between the parties on this point. Counsel for Clive Palmer argued that the
relevant risk is the risk of the virus becoming uncontrollable within Western
Australia, while Western Australia argued that the relevant risk is the risk of
spreading the COVID-19 virus within the State. 528 The Court had to carry out
separate proportionality analysis for each of these risks.529 Under both analyses,
the Court had to also take into account that Western Australia, in addition to its
hard border closure directive, had also in place all non-border “Common”
measures, with the exception of “an absolute limit on the numbers of people
permitted to meet in groups.”530 Both analyses turned on the uncertainty as to
whether, on the introduction of a COVID-19 case into Western Australia,
transmission within the community would be controllable or uncontrollable. 531
Put differently, the Court had to assess the health consequences of the
introduction of the virus into Western Australia.
Relevant to both identified risks was the fact that the COVID-19 virus has an
incubation period, before symptoms develop, of up to 14 days, while up to
around 40 percent of persons remain asymptomatic, even after contracting the
virus.532 By the time a hotspot is identified, therefore, a “number of generations
of transmission may have already occurred.”533 Moreover, testing for the virus,
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with an uptake of at most 50 percent, 534 was found to still return a negative result
for an infected person.535 Moreover, COVID-19 was said to have an exponential
transmission rate, suggesting that rapid uncontrolled transmission could result
from the introduction of a single case into the community, 536 even where nonborder measures such as surveillance and contact tracing are in place. 537 Around
10 percent of symptomatic cases were found to require hospitalization. 538
The Court emphasized the difference between border and non-border measures
in that “border measures reduce the risk of infected individuals entering the
community, whereas other measures reduce the risk that infected individuals
who enter the community will transmit disease into the community.” 539 The
Court, therefore found that “the border restrictions offer a tangible and
substantial layer of protection to the Western Australian community over the
protection offered by the Common Measures.” 540 Moreover, based on expert
evidence, the Court found that the probability of persons infected with COVID19 entering Western Australia under border restrictions to be low,
notwithstanding the risk of failure of hotel quarantine measures imposed on
exempt travelers.541 In comparison, expert opinion indicated that the same
probability under non-border measures would be increased,542 given that
“Western Australia would not have the capacity to safely manage the increased
numbers under a regime requiring mandatory hotel quarantining for all
entrants.”543 Based on the expert evidence, the Court came to the conclusion
that
the probability of there being any community transmission of
COVID-19 in Western Australia at present is negligible. However,
there is ongoing community transmission, both from known and
unknown sources, elsewhere in Australia. The experts specifically
agree in their joint report that border restrictions are important to
ensure higher transmission risk populations do not spread COVID19 to lower transmission risk populations. Therefore, the border
restrictions aim to guard the Western Australian population against
an ongoing risk.544
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The Court identified the relevant risk as “an ongoing risk.” This conclusion
relates to both types of risk identified by the parties, the risk of spreading the
virus within Western Australia, as well as the risk of the virus becoming
uncontrollable. Under the “Common” non-border measures, higher
transmission populations within Australia can lead to uncontrollable
transmission within Western Australia, even from one positive case coming into
the community.
As to alternative border measures, these were identified as, first a targeted
quarantine regime, and second, a hotspot regime. A targeted quarantine regime
requires that “any person entering Western Australia from a COVID-19 hotspot
designated by Western Australia to isolate for a period of 14 days on conditions
specified by Western Australia.”545 This regime is considered a border measure
because it targets persons from hotspots, where a hotspot is defined as “a region
or locality with a higher prevalence of COVID-19 cases than others.”546 These
hotspots are dynamic in the sense that the requisite prevalence changed
regularly depending on not only community transmission of the virus, but also
on asymptomatic testing rates in any given State, or part of a State. The second
border alternative, a hotspot regime, in comparison imposes hard border
closures where “people from a designated hotspot would be banned from
entering Western Australia altogether.”547
The analysis of the net benefit of border measures depended on the risk of
importation of the virus into Western Australia, and the efficacy of border
measures in mitigating this risk.548 However, the accuracy of the analysis was
limited by uncertainties relating to the efficacy of border measures. Assessing
this efficacy was limited given that “COVID-19 has only recently emerged in
the human population, the clinical, epidemiological and scientific knowledge
base in respect of the disease is limited.” 549 It was expected, therefore, that there
would be disagreement among the experts as to the effectiveness of the border
measures.550 After reviewing all available efficacy evidence the Court accepted
the opinion that:
border measures are an accepted and effective component of the
public health response to the control of infectious disease outbreaks.
That is reflected in the fact of controls upon Australia’s international
borders, and the effectiveness of border closures in New Zealand …
I accept that they are a particularly important measure for the
protection of a region with no community transmission from
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importation of the virus from regions with ongoing community
transmission.551
Expert evidence also indicated that even in comparison to a targeted quarantine
regime or a hotspot regime hard border closures are more effective, given that
where “a targeted quarantine regime or a hotspot regime does not cover the
whole of a State or Territory in which there is ongoing community transmission,
it would be less effective in preventing infected persons from travelling into
Western Australia than the existing border restrictions.”552
In summary, the Federal Court decision confirms that the hard border closures
imposed by Western Australia passed both hurdles of responding to an
emergency as well as being the only reasonable response to that emergency.
Following the judgment in the Federal Court, the matter was resumed in the
High Court. The parties agreed on a special case. There were two questions
stated in the special case. One related to costs, the other to the constitutionality
of the impugned hard border closures. This second question was formulated as
follows: “Are the Quarantine (Closing the Border) Directions (WA) and/or
the authorizing Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) invalid (in whole or
in part, and if in part, to what extent) because they impermissibly infringe s 92
of the Constitution?”.553 On 6 November 2020, the High Court answered this
question in favor of Western Australia, stating that section 56 and 67 of the 2005
Act did not infringe the mobility guarantee in section 92, because they were a
response to “an emergency constituted by the occurrence of a hazard in the
nature of a plague or epidemic.”554 The High Court of Australia, therefore,
confirmed the findings by the Federal Court in upholding Western Australia’s
hard border closures as permissible limitations on interstate mobility under the
Australian Constitution.
VI.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The Supreme Court is likely to uphold hard state border closures in response to
a pandemic. These closures prevent persons from entering a State unless they
belong to a category of exempt travelers. This conclusion is a gloss on the
observation that “It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify an instance in
which judicial intervention has prevented effective emergency action.” 555
Judicial review is unlikely to provide relief while the health emergency is at its
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height.556 The permissibility of hard state border closures as a restriction on the
right to interstate travel turns on whether the nature of the threat, namely the
COVID-19 global pandemic, necessitates an exercise of the police power under
state emergency legislation. 557 The analysis looks at the threat giving rise to a
stated objective, rather than a characterization of the response to that threat, i.e.,
the action taken to achieve the objective. Balancing state action against
alternative responses to the epidemic requires erring on the side of caution given
the inherent uncertainty of just how effective prophylactic measures are in
preventing community transmission of the pandemic,558 an uncertainty that is
likely to linger even ex post the pandemic.559
In response to COVID-19, no U. S. State imposed hard border closures. In
response to future pandemics, to mitigate the need for more intrusive non-border
measures, such as curfews and non-essential business closures, as seen in
response to COVID-19,560 States should consider implementing hard border
closures. Under an extreme emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the
validity of actions to respond to this threat cannot be ascertained through a
proportionality test.561 There is simply not enough certainty in available data on
the best way to combat the virus. We are only certain of the fact that the World
Health Organization (WHO) has classified the threat of the COVID-19
epidemic as a pandemic. 562 The extreme nature of this event is evinced by its
scale. When faced with an extreme emergency that is compounded by lack of
information on the best response, time is of the essence. The decision-maker
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should implement the safest action. In the context of COVID-19, the safest
action is hard border closures.563
However, the above normative signal is limited to the constitutional analysis
furnished in this paper. This analysis does not extend to considering the
constitutionality of State legislative intervention to limit potential exposure to
damages once such closures are in place. Nor does it extend to considering
pandemic protectionism, where State action in response to the threat of
community transmission is influenced by potential electoral rents from pursuing
hard border closures.564 These issues, while relevant to a wider evaluation of the
implementation of hard border closures, do not affect the constitutionality of
permissible limitations on the right to interstate travel. In addition, the analysis
is only part of a larger feasibility question that needs to also take into account
social and economic factors that could militate against adopting such border
measures.
When refocusing the research problem on possibilities for Supreme Court
review, thinking about hard state border closures can also be framed within a
wider construction question on how States should respond to extreme
emergencies. In this article, I have followed a business-as-usual model to
analyze infringement on a fundamental right during a pandemic. Under this
“strict enforcement” model, 565 constitutional analysis proceeds as usual, as if
there is no pandemic. The rationale for using this model is that, given “the
Constitution was intended to function in emergencies as well as in normal
times,”566 the same framework that tests the constitutionality of infringement on
fundamental rights continues to apply to government actions taken in response
to the pandemic. A broad interpretation of the Constitution is integral to this
approach so that state governments can respond effectively to emergencies. 567
As early as 1798, the Supreme Court has recognized a Tenth Amendment State
residual police power to respond to a health emergency.568 When this response
infringes on fundamental individual rights, such as those sourced from the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the government encroachment
has to be justified under strict scrutiny by showing that the impugned State
action is necessary to protect a compelling State interest.569 The difficulty with
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this view is that it “disregards the reality of government exercise of
extraordinary measures and powers in response to emergencies”. 570
Other models, however, have been suggested in lieu of the business-as-usual
model.571 A second model is based on accommodation,572 where a form of
“crisis jurisprudence”573 tweaks the applicable constitutional framework to
afford state and federal governments more flexibility in responding to the
pandemic. In particular, where the government intervenes to protect public
safety in times of war, the Supreme Court is likely to “defer to emergency policy
once they determine that an emergency exists.” 574 Alternatively, the Court is
likely to make the review standard easier to meet due to the emergency. 575
Under this model, “conditions which may be characterized as an ‘emergency’
are likely to support significant restrictions on individual liberty.” 576 It follows
that balancing state response to the emergency against the infringed individual
right can now proceed under one of the lower scrutiny standards, namely,
intermediate scrutiny or rational basis.577 Quantitative studies suggest that
“when crises threaten the nation’s security, the justices are substantially more
likely to curtail rights and liberties than when peace prevails.” 578 This view is
criticized as leading to a “slippery slope toward excessive governmental
infringement on individual rights and liberties while undermining constitutional
structures and institutions in the process.”579
The third model suggests that during a pandemic, federal and state governments
can respond extra-constitutionally.580 This view, which sometimes is also
570
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referred to as the suspension approach, 581 suggest that governments “may act
extralegally when they believe that such action is necessary for protecting the
nation and the public in the face of calamity, provided that they openly and
publicly acknowledge the nature of their actions.” 582 A stronger version claims
that governments must act extralegally in response to emergencies.583 The
rationale for this view recognizes explicitly the need for extraconstitutional
State action in response to a health emergency. 584 Put differently, “law is good
in ordinary times but that it must be suspended when extreme measures are
needed.”585 This rationale is based on efficiency, the fact that the “government’s
ability to act swiftly, secretly, and decisively against a threat to the life of the
nation becomes superior to the ordinary principles of limitation on
governmental powers and individual rights.” 586 Historically, a line of cases
dating back to World War I and World War II indicate that judicial review,
regardless of the applied scrutiny standard, “has largely failed to protect
individual rights when their protection is most needed.” 587 Therefore, the
extraconstitutional approach replaces judicial review with political
accountability, either directly through elections, or indirectly, through
legislative intervention.
The business-as-usual model adopted in this article is the hardest hurdle to pass,
as it imposes a strict scrutiny standard. Showing that the Supreme Court is likely
to find such closures constitutional under this view, gives assurance even if the
accommodation or extra-constitutional views are adopted. The legal challenge
to Western Australia’s hard border illustrates how this model has been applied
by the High Court of Australia, and how it is likely to be applied by the Supreme
Court in response to future pandemics. Moreover, at least in theory, the
accommodation and extraconstitutional models can engage in a downward
cycle towards more repressive laws. Bruce Ackerman once wrote that “Terrorist
581
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attacks will be a recurring part of our future,” 588 predicting that “Even if the
next half-century sees only four or five attacks on the scale of September 11,
this destructive cycle will prove devastating to civil liberties by 2050.” 589 The
cycle results from political attempts to prevent further attacks by imposing more
infringements on individual rights. A similar downward cycle is likely to be
obtained in a health emergency. We have seen this ratcheting approach in the
severity of restrictions imposed during the second wave of the COVID-19
pandemic.590 Assuming that the Supreme Court will use strict enforcement to
balance the right to interstate travel against hard state borders takes into account
the Courts effort to prevent or break this cycle.
At a deeper analytical level, the finding on hard border closures invites a wider
rethinking of how we need to construct the Constitution’s rendition of the
federal ideal. There is a need for a reconstruction of American federalism as a
dynamic form of the principle of subsidiarity. 591 As observed by Steven
Calabresi and Lucy Bickford back in 1994, “our time is witness to the decline
and fall of nation-states as they dissolve from above and from below.” 592 In this
weltanschauung, globalization is being replaced by continentalization. 593 The
principle explains how this continentalization can come about. It allows for a
move away from strict division of powers between federal and state
governments and envisages instead a dynamic sharing of these powers to
optimize governance. 594 In the United States, however, subsidiarity is a
constitutional pariah. 595 To be clear, my point is not about the Supreme Court
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revival of federal limits on national power,596 but about the efficiency demands
remodulating federal limits on state power. Subsidiarity, which extends to
contexts beyond responding to extreme emergencies, holds the promise of
forming a centripetal field over the U.S. political spectrum because it allows for
local elasticities along socioeconomic divides. It thus even suggests a revival of
radical reimagination, not only of the calculus of power distribution, but of the
territorial evolution of the United States as a polity—in itself a generous
unifying force. The defeat of the Confederacy in the Civil War (1861-1865)
only strengthened the “manifest destiny” theory promulgated by the United
States in the 19th century, which prophesized the expansion of the United States
across the rest of North America. Arguably, “the most enduring statement of
America’s Manifest Destiny” was Lincoln’s Gettysburg address on 19
November 1863.597 A similar support comes from the theory of
“continentalism,”598 which shares the same prophecy. These theories call for
peaceful expansion, for example, such as the Alaska purchase (on 18 October
1867),599 to a continental scale, as already seen in Australia—from water to
water. Subsidiarity can illuminate a federal goldilocks zone that expands the
efficiency gains from federation, and therefore, allows for the emergence of
much larger, continental, polities.
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